



Challenges of State Building in The Republic of South Sudan

(2011–2020AD)

Dr. Goch Guor Goch

First edition 2024 AD



Political Studies Series (4)

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الإيداع القانوني

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لا يسمح بإعادة إصدار هذا الكتاب أو أي جزء منه أو تخزينه كنسخة إلكترونية أو نقله
بأي شكل من الأشكال دون إذن خطي مسبق من المؤلف والناشر

Dedication

This book is dedicated to:

My late mother, Akeer Mading Ajang;

My wife, Mary Koch Kongor Malual;

My eldest daughters: Akeer and Sunday;

My daughter-in-law, Adhieu Juach Atem (Atemagook);

My grandsons: Ayiik and Goch Ajak;

My sister-in-law, Agau Akech Deng;

My nephews: Goch Ayiik Akech and Chol Ayiik Akech.

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Abbreviations

CAR	Central African Republic
CCNP	Concerned Citizen’s Network for Peace
CDF	Constituency Development Fund
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo.
EU	European Union
FDs	Former Detainees
FFAMC	Fiscal and Financial Allocation Monitoring Commission
GDP	Growth Domestic Product
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JDB	Joint Defense Board
JTSC	Joint Transitional Security Committee
NCC	National Constitution Conference
NCP	National Congress Party
NCRC	National Constitution Review Commission
NEC	National Elections Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OPP	Other Political Parties
R-ARCSS	Revitalized- Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
RJMEC	Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
R-TGONU	Revitalized- Transitional Government of National Unity
SACDNU	Sudan African Closed Districts National Union

SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SANU	Sudan African National Union
SPLM/SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army
SPLM/SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army- In Opposition
SSBC	South Sudan Broadcast Corporation
SSDF	South Sudan Democratic Forum
SSDF	South Sudan Defense Force
SSOA	South Sudan Opposition Alliance
SSPDF	South Sudan People's Defense Force
TGONU	Transitional Government of National Unity
TNLA	Transitional National Legislative Assembly
TNLA	Transitional National Legislative Assembly
UDSF	United Democratic Salvation Front
USAP	United Sudan African Party
WHO	World Health Organization

Introduction

When the interim period of the comprehensive Peace agreement (CPA) expired, the Republic of South Sudan was declared on 9 July 2011, and on 14 July 2011, it was admitted into the United Nations as the 193 member state of the United Nations.

Immediately after independence, South Sudan embarked on development projects, such as good governance, economic development, social and human development, and conflict prevention and security.

The political process in South Sudan was smooth during two years following independence, but intra-party rivalry within the ruling party (Sudan People's Liberation Movement) paralyzed the functioning of the government. The wrangling for position led to the current political crisis. The crisis started when President Salva Kiir sacked his vice president Dr. Riek Machar in July 2013, followed by the suspension of secretary-general Pagan Amum. Unhappiness of influential leaders within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) culminated into fighting on 15 December 2013, in the capital Juba, between forces loyal to president and those loyal to his vice president. Such fighting spread outside the capital to include Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity State.

Research problem:

The Republic of South Sudan as a new nation faces many obstacles to reach state building. The study is intended to resolve the following questions:

1. What are the challenges that face state building in the Republic of South Sudan?
2. Will be possible to modernize the Sudan people's liberation army to become a professional army?
3. The economy of South Sudan is on the verge of collapsing, what mechanism to be used in order to recover it?
4. What formula which will reconcile and bring about social and cultural co-existence between communities in South Sudan?
5. What type of political system can fit the Republic of South Sudan?

6. What methods to be adopted for resolving political crisis in the Republic of South Sudan?

Research Limit:

The study concerns with the country of South Sudan since its independence in July 2011 till 2020.

Hypothesis:

The research answers the following hypothesis:

1. Challenges and crisis of state building in the Republic of South Sudan, such challenges include political, military, economic, social and security issues. These challenges threaten state building in South Sudan .
2. South Sudan enjoys Multiple of economic, and human resources, if such resources are exploited properly, South Sudan will be progressive country
3. South Sudan inherited weak institutions and many problems from Sudan which have become threat for the building a viable state.
4. Military, political, economic and cultural elements affect state building in South Sudan.
5. Wise political leadership and stable institutions should play a positive role in state building in South Sudan.
6. Civil Society organizations have contributed a lot in resolving many issues, facing South Sudan, and such organizations can continue supporting state building in South Sudan.

Objectives:

The objectives of the study are the following:

1. To find the causes and impact of the crisis on the state building in the Republic of South Sudan.
2. To find resolution of conflict, whether political, military, economic and social problems.

3. To explore strategies and techniques of resolving issues facing South Sudan.

Importance of Research:

The study will address the crisis of state building in South Sudan, and solve many problems concerning politics, economic, social and cultural diversity in South Sudan. The research will also concentrate on peace building, because realization of peace will bring political stability and in turn economic development will be realized.

Methodology:

The study will be based on historical, analytical and descriptive methods. Sources of data will be collected from: books, magazines, articles, newspapers, internet, etc.

Previous Studies:

Due to its peculiar as a new nation, South Sudan lacks previous studies. No studies have been carried out, except this study of mine which will be the first study for South Sudan. Some writers have written articles in some Journals and delivered lectures in some institutions. Such articles and lectures have provided useful information and recommendations for the resolution of critical issues facing South Sudan since its independence in 2011. Those periodical articles and lectures are the following:

1. Leben Moro, "State building and legitimacy: Experiences of South Sudan", Secure livelihood Research Centre. (London), May 2017.
2. Nicodemus Minde; "The SPLM Government and challenges of conflict Settlement, State – Building and peace building in South Sudan", Africa Insight, Vol. 45, No.1.
3. Wolfram Lacher, South Sudan: International State Building and its Limits, Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik, Berlin, February 2012.
4. Israel Nyaburi Nyadera, "South Sudan conflict from 2013 – 2018, Rethinking the causes, situation and solution", <https://www.Researchgate.net>, December, 2018.

5. Dr. Faiz Omer Mohamed Jamie, the dilemma of conflict and State building in South Sudan, <https://www.academia.edu>, May 2015.
6. Jok Madut Jok, Diversity , Unity, and nation- building in South Sudan, Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, (www.usip.org), October 2011.

Research organization:

The research comprises introduction and four chapters, the first is the Concept of State Building, which composes three sections: Section One: includes, definition, elements and requirements of state building; Section Two comprises Causes and impact of crisis on state building; Section Three is relation between management of crisis and state building.

Chapter Two is about the Republic of South Sudan since independence, and it includes three sections, Section One explains Declaration of independence of the Republic of South Sudan; Section Two discusses political and military situation in the Republic of South Sudan; Section Three examines economic, social and cultural situation in the Republic of South Sudan.

Chapter Three tackles crises in the Republic of South Sudan and it contains three sections, Section One explains impact of political and military crisis on state building; Section Two discusses impact of economic crisis on state building; Section Three examines impact of social and cultural diversity on state building.

Chapter Four concerns about the official and popular (civil societies) role in crisis management in the Republic of South Sudan, and it includes three sections which are: Section one discusses the role of institutions and political leadership; Section Two tackles popular (civil societies) role in crisis management in the Republic of South Sudan; Section Three examines the future of state building in the Republic of South Sudan. Lastly, conclusion, results- facts finding, recommendations and References.

Chapter One

Theoretical Framework of State Building

Chapter One

Theoretical Framework of State Building

Section One:

Definition, element and requirement of state building:

According to Anders Persson, a political scientist, state building is based on three dimensions; a security dimension, a political dimension and an economic dimension. Among these three, security is most considered as the first priority. Such view is emphasized by many academic literatures. It stresses that state building cannot be possible without security.

Definition:

There are two theoretical approaches of defining state-building:

First theory: state-building is viewed by some theorists as an active undertaken by external actors attempting to build, or rebuild the institutions of a weaker, post-conflict or failed state. This school of international relations views state-building as the activity of one country in relation to another, generally following intervention approach.

Second theory: developmental theory. It follows a set of principles which identified state building as an area for development assistances. The developmental view was expressed in a number of research papers by development agencies. These papers argued that state building is mainly a political process rather than a technical capacity enhancements and considers state building as involving three dimensions political deals, prioritization of core government functions and the willingness to respond to public expectations⁽¹⁾.

(1) <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/state-building>, publish 2006, internet 22/1/2021 pp1-2. 30/10/2018.

Elements and requirements of state-building:

Most scholars agree that elements of state-building means monopoly of security apparatus and its legitimate use of violence in an area under its control. Requirements of building a modern state can include promoting of legitimate and sustainable institutions, which are standing army, diplomatic corps, centralized administration and bureaucracy for tax collection. The state-building requires also replacement of traditional legal system with rational laws based on the rule of law, the demarcation of national economies and the incorporation of populations as citizens rather than tribal, sectarian and religious groups.

Requirements of state-building were first developed in western Europe in the 16th century through reinforcing process of making war, raising taxes and establishing a centralized administration to oversee and maximize success in both war and taxation. In western Europe such changes were characterized by transition from feudalism to absolutism to emphasize on the differences of political establishment that may accompany the state-building process, because both democracy and authoritarianism require a state to defend its borders, govern its citizens and draw or collect resources from them⁽¹⁾.

Mutations in the international system during the 20th and 21st centuries have changed the primary energetic of state building. The ruthless instrument of interstate military competition that marked the emergence of nation-state in Western Europe in previous centuries came to an end. Therefore, the campaign for reasoning is no longer an obligatory of state survival, and from the state-builders view, it is no longer as important that growth in state size be conformed through increase in state capacity. Instead, a multitude of other aspects may force state expansion. A generally mentioned factor is the need to sustain a domestic ruling coalition, particularly in societies with divided political elites⁽²⁾.

(1) Topic: [ConorO'Dwyer, state-building Britannica.com](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-building) <https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-building>

(2) Ibid, p.2.

Section two:

Causes and impact of crisis on state building:

States develop and prosper when conducive atmosphere exist, such as political and economic stability, but if there is no stability, there will be no opportunity for economic activities. So, politics is interrelated with economic development. If there is a political crisis, there will be no farming, because there is no security for such activity.

States failed, due to inability to control its subjects who are residing within the territory under its control.

Some political analysts conceive that state failed because of two main reasons, referred as failure to control and the failure to promote human prospering or social welfare.

Causes of state failure can be narrowed in two perceptions: failure to control and failure to advance or promote human prospering.

1. The failure to control in this perception failure to control means in ability of state institutions to control actors within its defined territories. According to Robert I. Rotberg, failed states cannot control their peripheral regions, particularly those regions occupied by out- groups⁽¹⁾. It is important to recall, that control and failure should not be seen as absolutes. A failed state in this concept of the term might successfully control some parts of its territory. Such example includes Sudan, Somalia and South Sudan.
2. The failure to promote human prospering or social welfare. In this second perception, state failed due to the lack of capacity or lack political will. If state failed to provide services to its whole population rather than favoring one section of it, such act is considered as failure of the state.

The system of nepotism in which government favors particular section of its population has been going on unabated in Africa since independence of some African countries.

Robert Mugabe's action of confiscating white's farms in Zimbabwe to be redistributed to his supporters is the best example.

(1) Paul D. Williams, state failure in Africa: causes, consquencies and responses. www.europaworld.com, p. 1.

Causes of state failure:

There is no particular formula to understand the causes of state failure in Africa. There is some available literature on the matter that makes two relevant main contrast. The first contrast is between states that fail due to the lack of pertinent capacity and those that fail to advance the interests of all their residents by political preference, frequently with the aim of profiting the incumbent government and its followers at the cost of another section within the state. On the other hand, the government may like to restore law and order to some parts of its territory but lacks the relevant means to do so⁽¹⁾, such example is the case of the Ugandan regime's inability to crush the Lord Resistance Army and Sudan's incapability to defeat the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Army.

Such inability may sometimes lead to political compromise when the two warring parties reached to stage of stalemate. For instance, when the Sudan government failed to defeat SPLM/A, it reached compromise agreement in which Southern Sudan was given a choice to secede from the Sudan or remain in union with Sudan. At the end Southern Sudan opted to separate at the end of interim period according to the term of comprehensive peace agreement signed by the government of Sudan and Sudan People's Liberation Movement Army in Nivasha, Kenya in 2005.

In the case of South Sudan, government controlled the situation when the civil war erupted in 2013, and many areas fell out of government control.

Regarding economic development, the government may like to improve wellbeing of its citizens but lack resources to do so. The examples of such attempts are the governments of Sierra Leon, Rwanda and Liberia.

The second contrast aspects to the differences between formational and accidental causes of state failure. In the formational type, three major debates are usually promoted. Firstly, the "Westphalian ideal of statehood" has not well taken root in Africa, due to local situations which were not hospitable to state building⁽²⁾. Secondly, formational debate has turned around the provocations presented by political geography, specially resources and

(1) Paul D. Williams, state failure in Africa: causes, consquences and responses. www.europaworld.com, p. 1.

(2) Ibid.

environmental elements. In this question, you can recall that most of African countries were created by colonial powers without considering of geography and environment conducive to an effective administration of the state. Thirdly, formational argument has used the notion of security predicament to explain the fear of an ungoverned players within the state. Such actors can cause the collapse of the central government if the government could not handle them wisely⁽¹⁾.

The accidental causes of state failure in Africa are summed up as five factors, such as bad leaders, rapacious players-actors such as warlords, bad economic policies, unconducive environments and unfriendly or bad neighbors.⁽²⁾

Firstly, greatly the blame for the failure of state has been piled upon African leaders. Mismanagement of state affairs by political leaders or ruling elite is the main reason for the state failure, because leaders favor their relatives and supporters in order to prolong their rules, for instance, Siad Barre of Somalia, Mobuto of Zaire, Moamer Gaddafi of Libya, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Omer Bongo of Gabon clinged on power in their countries through policies of patronage.

Secondly, Warlords and Spoilers have been rebutted for igniting ethnic tensions and precipitating state failure. The motives of predatory players differ from condition to condition but used assertion is that they have violent procedures to accumulate wealth through the control of markets. In this thinking, weak state institutions provide a situation in which warlords can profit from it.

The third factor which contributes to the failure of state involves the political economy of the failed state. When governments adopt bad fiscal policies or bad macroeconomic policies, it will result into fiscal deficits and collapse of economy.

Fourth, the proliferation of armaments in many weak and fragile African countries has led to the failure of states. An atmosphere in which arms float is conducive for anarchy. Such environment makes it difficult for governments

(1) Ibid.

(2) Paul D. Williams, previous ref.

to control its territory because unlawful or warlords are very strong in those areas of anarchy.

Fifth accidental cause of state failure involves the role play by players within neighboring countries. These have turned to be either governments in power hostile to their neighboring governments such as Gaddafi of Libya in the 1980s which destabilized their country. Rwanda with or without help from Uganda. These circumstances can lead to the failure of state.⁽¹⁾

Impact of crisis on state building:

Impact of state failure on state building. Problems of failed states threaten major powers who fear about spread of crisis to their countries, and the locals or domestic actors who are to endure consequences of crisis, in their countries. Since the end of the cold war, failing states have become the problem for international system.

Failed states can produce a type of transnational security trouble with terrorism, crimes, disease, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional instability. The said problems are threats to international community and also to domestic stability.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Africa has produced many failed states which include Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, Somalia and Zimbabwe. These failed states have failed to control their territories and to deliver services to their citizens, and such incapability has led into the collapse of state institutions in those countries (failed countries)⁽²⁾.

Section Three:

Relation between management of crisis and state-building

The term crisis has many meanings and there is no agreed meaning, but there is a consensus which constitutes a crisis. A crisis is defined as a

(1) Paul D. Williams, previous ref.

(2) Ibid.

significant threat to operations that can have negative repercussions if not managed correctly⁽¹⁾. Gibsons defines crisis as the result of a “management failure to respond appropriately to an issue, emergency or accident that requires a timely response and communication”⁽²⁾. Coombs defines crisis as a “significant threat of operations that can have negative consequences if not handled properly”⁽³⁾.

In crisis management, the threat is the possible damage a crisis can inflict on an organization or system, its stakeholders and an industry. A crisis can create three threats:

1. Public safety.
2. Financial loss.
3. Reputation loss.

The roots of crisis management are in emergency and disaster. Mitroff and Anagnos argue that unlike emergency and risk management which deal mainly with natural disasters, the field of crisis management deals primarily with man-made or human-caused crises.

Crisis management is divided into three stages:

1. Pre-crisis.
2. Crisis response.
3. Post-crisis.

The pre-crisis stage is concern with prevention and preparation. The crisis response stage is when management must response to a crisis. The post-crisis stage looks for better ways to prepare to next crisis and executes

(1) Dilenschneider, R. L. (2000). The corporate communications bible: Everything you need to know to become a public relations. Export. Beverly Hills: new Millennium.

(2) Khalid Zamoun and Tevhide Sera Gorpe, crisis management :A historical and conceptual approach for a better understanding to Todays crisis. P. 9. June 27th 2018. Intechopen.

(3) Coombs, W. T. 2006. Code red in the boardroom: crisis management as organizational DNA. Westport CN: Praeger.

commitments made during the crisis period including follow-up information⁽¹⁾.

Pre-crisis stage: It involves preventing or reducing known risks that can lead to a crisis. Both Barton and Coombs conclude that organizations are better able to tackle crises when they have a crisis management plan, a designated crisis management team and pre-draft messages⁽²⁾.

Crisis response: the crisis response is what management does and says after the crisis happened. This stage is divided into two stages:

1. The initial crisis response.
2. Reputation repair and behavioral intention.

The initial response focuses on quick response, accurate response and consistent.

Post crisis Reputation repair and behavioral intentions:

Many researchers in public relations, communication and marketing have come up with some strategies to repair the reputational damage a crisis inflicts on the organization. Coombs and other scholars came up with the master list of reputation strategies. Such list include:

1. Attack the accuser, which means that a crisis manager encounters the person or group claiming something incorrect with the organization.
2. Denial, crisis manager must assert that there is no crisis.
3. Scapegoat, crisis manager should blame somebody or group outside the organization.
4. Excuse, crisis manager must minimize organizational responsibility by denying bad intention to harm.
5. Justification, crisis manager must minimize the perceived damage effected by the crisis.

(1) Ibid

(2) Bartom L., **crisis in organization II (2nd ed.)**, OH: college Divisons South-Western, p 2. (2001).

6. Reminder, crisis manager should tell stakeholders about the past good works of the organization.
7. Ingratiation, crisis manager praises stakeholders for their actions.
8. Compensation, crisis manager offers money or gift to victims.
9. Apology: crisis manager should apologise and ask for forgiveness from the stakeholders⁽¹⁾.

(1) Coombs, W. T. (2007a). ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing and responding (2nd ed.), pp 78-87, Los Angeles: Sage.

Chapter Two

The Republic of South Sudan

Chapter Two

The Republic of South Sudan

Section One:

South Sudan: From Unity with the north to Independence:

South Sudan is officially known as the Republic of South Sudan. It's bordered by Sudan to the north, Ethiopia to the East, Kenya on the Southeast, Uganda to the South, The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to the Southwest and the Central African Republic (CAR) to the West. It became an independent state from the Sudan in 2011.

Turkey–Egyptian Conquest:

Before 2011, South Sudan was one of Sudan's regions. The unified modern Sudan was created by Turkey-Egyptian colonial authority. In 1821, Mohammed Ali Pasha dispatched a military expedition led by his son Ismael Pasha to Sudan in order to conquer it. It overran Northern Sudan and marched towards Sinnar, the capital city of Sinnar Sultanate. The invading force entered Sinnar city 13 June 1821, ending the rule of the last Funj Sultan Badi VI. After the collapse of the Sultanate of Sinnar, the viceroy of Egypt, Mohammed Ali Pasha established political authority in Sudan under his dynasty⁽¹⁾.

After consolidating its power over northern Sudan, the Turkey–Egyptian Forces started expanding their control to include southern Sudan. In 1827, Ali Khurshid Pasha led a force through the Dinka lands and in 1830, he reached the Juba area. The Turkey- Egyptian armies tried to establish Military Garrisons in the region, but disease, bad environment and defection forced

(1) P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, A History of the Sudan : From the coming of Islam to the Present day, Fifth edition, Pearson Education limited (London), 2000, P.46.

them to abandon their advance beyond Juba. Under the pressure from European powers, Egypt allowed European traders and missionaries in 1851 to operate in the region⁽¹⁾.

The first invasion was by Turkey –Egyptian colonial master under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Passha's dynasty.

The Turkish rule continued in Sudan until it was expelled by the Mahdiya revolution in 1885.

The second invasion was carried by Anglo-Egyptian alliance, in which the two countries set up a system called Anglo-Egyptian Condominium until Sudan got its independence in 1956⁽²⁾.

The Policy of Anglo-Egyptian Government towards Southern Sudan:

To achieve its objective of containment of Islam in the Southern Sudan, the British government sought to limit the spread of Islam in the South. In 1918 the government changed the day of rest to be Sunday instead of Friday in the South⁽³⁾. Slave trade was suppressed vigorously and northern traders were transferred from Southern Sudan to Northern Sudan and Southerners were prevented to travel to the north. Under the provisions of the passports and permits ordinance of 1922, the South was classified as "closed districts", effecting the banning of northern traders and restriction of southerners travelling to the north to get job⁽⁴⁾. Tribal consciousness was encouraged, and by 1922, chiefs' courts were set up under the supervision of British officials. The banning of northerners to reside in the south and the preconditions of indirect Rule constituted the administrative view of what to be called "Southern Policy"⁽⁵⁾. This policy which was initiated officially in 1930, required grouping of self-contained tribal entities based on their

(1) Beska, Emmanuel, Muhammed Ali's conquest of Sudan (1820- 1824), *Asian and African Studies*, 2019, Vol.28, No. 1 , pp30- 56.

(2) <http://en.wikipedia.org/w/South Sudan>;p1.

(3) Deng, Gabriel Acuoth, wars & a new vision for Sudan, Nairobi 2005, p78

(4) P.M. Holt and M. W. Daly, A history of the Sudan, 5th edition person Education limited, (London) , 2000, P.119.

(5) *ibid*.

indigenous customs and beliefs . As Collins comments:

" In order to encourage indigenous, African customs in the South, all Northern Sudanese , Arab influences were to be eradicated , for African traditions , already weakened by a century of chaos, could hardly hope to flourish in the face of the dynamic and expansive culture of the Northern Sudan"⁽¹⁾.

To implement such policy, some procedures were taken as following:-

1. All Northern administrators were transferred from Southern Sudan to Northern Sudan .
2. Trading permits of Northerners were cancelled .
3. Every administrator was instructed to speak the language of the people of his district or English, but not Arabic , and was to associate himself with local customs and beliefs .
4. The wearing of Arabic dress and the use of Arabic names by Southerners were discouraged⁽²⁾.

After the end of second world war in 1945, the British government began to prepare southern Sudan for eventual separation from the north and Annex it to east Africa. This policy of separating the south from the north faced opposition from northern politicians. By 1946, the government felt the pressure of northern politicians who were against the separation of Southern Sudan from Northern Sudan. In order to find view points of northerners, the governor-general formed a special committee and called for a conference in April 1946. The conference came out with resolution to send subcommittee came back with the suggestion that South Sudan be merged with Northern Sudan. The British government accepted the proposal of union between south and north Sudan , based on the recommendation of the civil secretary, J. W. Robertson⁽³⁾.

After the conclusion of the issue of the union between South and North Sudan, the National legislative assembly of the whole Sudan declared on

(1) Deng Gabriel Acuoth , war & a new vision for Sudan , Nairobi, 2005, p. 79.

(2) Ibid, p 80.

(3) Ibid, p.82

December 19, 1955 that Sudan would attain its independence on January 1, 1956. On January 1, 1956, Sudan became an independent state, and immediately the problem of national unity became a challenge to the new government.

The Independent Sudan and the issue of southern Sudan :

The post - independence politics in Sudan witnessed disagreement about the political system to be adopted or how to reach a consensus regarding national unity . The northern politicians wanted a centralized system of government, whereas the southern politicians opted for local autonomy or special status for southern Sudan. The two parties reached a stalemate during the first years of parliamentary regime. The policy of post-independence government was to maintain unity of the country by all means. To achieve that objective , the government embarked on implementing policy of Arabization and Islamization in Southern Sudan. On the other hand, southerners wanted to reserve their local cultures and therefore, refused to accept centralized system . Such disagreement paralyzed functioning of the state and invited the military to takeover power from the politicians. On November 17, 1958, the military under the leadership of Major General Ibrahim Abboud, toppled the first democratically elected government. Before independence, southerners were convinced that northern politicians would not resolved problem of Southern Sudan , and therefore, a mutiny took place in Torit town on 18 August 1955. That mutiny was suppressed and life came into normalcy.

The policies of the military government escalated tension between southern and northern Sudan. The Abboud regime applied radical solutions to the problem of southern Sudan. Administratively, the government appointed northerners as provincial governors in three southern provinces and transferred southerners to the north. The policy of Abboud regarding education and religion was vigorous. To execute policy of Arabization and Islamization , the Abboud regime opened “six intermediate Islamic institutes” in Southern Sudan, Mosques were built , missions were not allowed to open new schools and the day of rest was changed from Sunday to Friday. Missionaries going on leave were not given re-entry visa to the Sudan. Religious activities were confined in the Church premises. In 1962, the

government issued the Missionary Society Act to regulate missionaries' Activities in Sudan, and on February 22, 1964 the government expelled foreign missionaries working in the south. These policies of subduing southerners had repercussions and many southerners fled to neighboring countries and established resistance movement. In February 1962, Father Saturnino Lahure, Joseph Oduho and William Deng Nhial formed the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU) in Leopoldville (Kinshasa), Congo and became the following year (1963) as Sudan African National Union (SANU) with headquarters in Kampala, Uganda⁽¹⁾. By August 1963, the military wing called Anya-Nya was established in order to launch a military operation. The name Anya-Nya in Madi Language means "Snake venom"⁽²⁾.

The objective of the first civil war led by Sanu was to achieve total independence of Southern Sudan. The first Civil War lasted seventeen years and peace agreement was signed in March 1972 ,in Addis Ababa between the government of Sudan and South Sudan Liberation Movement led by Gen . Joseph Lagu . The terms of that agreement established the local autonomy in Southern Sudan region.

The Addis Ababa peace agreement did not last longer, in 1983 the second civil war erupted and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement / Army(SPLM/A) came into being. It was established by Dr. John Garang de Mabior , and the aim of the SPLM/SPLA was to transform the old Sudan to new Sudan on a new basis. The policies of president Nimeiry Ignited tensions and problems in Southern Sudan. On 5th June 1983, Nimeiry abrogated Addis Ababa peace accord and divided Southern Sudan to three regions- Upper Nile, Equatoria and Bahr el - Ghazal⁽³⁾. In September 1983, he declared Islamic Sharia Law to be imposed in the Whole of Sudan . Such policies Pushed Southern Sudan Population to go back to war in order to materialize just and equitable Sudan⁽⁴⁾.

(1) P.M. holt and M. W. Daly , history of the Sudan, 5th edition , pearson education, London, 2000, pp 153 – 54

(2) Elias Nyamlell Wakoson, the origin and development of the Anya-Nya Movement 1955-1972), in Mohamed Omer Bashir (edit) Southern Sudan: Regionalism & Religion, Graduate College Publications, No 10, University of Khartoum, Khartoum 1984, p. 127

(3) History of South Sudan: Wikipedia, Turko-Egyptian Conquest under the Muhamed Ali Dynasty , [https://en. Wikipedia -org/wiki/Egyptian conquest 6, Sudan \(1820-1821\)](https://en. Wikipedia -org/wiki/Egyptian_conquest_6,_Sudan_(1820-1821)) pp. 8 – 9

(4) Ibid.

The Second Civil War in Sudan between the northern and southern Sudan was a result of aggressive and bad policies applied by Nimeiry's regime towards Southern Sudan. The rebellion which erupted on May 16, 1983, in Bor town, Jonglei province, led to total civil war in the South. The Mutiny which occurred on 16th May, 1983, was done by 105 Battalion of the Sudan's army and that Battalion was commanded by Major Kerubino Kuanyin Bol. The incident of 105 Battalion influenced many other military units across Southern Sudan and later on Battalion 104 joined the rebellion and many people fled to neighbouring countries, particularly Ethiopia. At the time of the battle in Bor, Col. Dr. John Garang de mabior was in Bor town spending his annual leave.

On 16th June, 1983, Major William Nyuon Bany, the commander of 104 Ayod garrison launched an offensive against the government's forces which were sent from Malakal to reinforce the Ayod garrison. The reinforcement was destroyed and Major William Nyuon joined the rebellion and went to Ethiopia with all the organized forces, which included police, Army personnel, wildlife, prison wardens and all the district council officials and employees.

While in Bor, Dr. John Garang was preparing to follow the mutineers who headed to Ethiopian border. He left Bor accompanied by his wife, Nyandeng Chol Atem, his sons Mabior and Chol, Cagai Atem Biar, Maker Deng Malou, Mabior Kuir Maketh, Thon Akec Akur and two others⁽¹⁾.

The formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA):

After his arrival in Ethiopia, Dr. John Garang de Mabior started organizing the mutineers in order to form an effective movement. On 14th June, 1983, the general meeting was convened which was attended by Col. Dr. John Garang, captain Salva Kiir Mayardit, Cagai Atem Biar and 55 non-commission officers (NCOs) of the former 105 Battalion of Bor garrison for the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA). The meeting ended without compromise agreement and it was postponed to be re-convened in near future.

(1) Deng, Gabriel, Acuoth, Wars and a new vision for Sudan, Nairobi, 2005, pp. 120-128

On 6th July 1983, the four groups or factions of the revolution, reconvened a meeting in Itang and signed a unity agreement which led to the establishment of a unified movement. Those who signed the Unity agreement were:

1. Col. Dr. John Garang de Mabior representing SPLM/SPLA.
2. Commander Gordon Kong Chuol representing Bilpam Anya- Nyall.
3. Garjek Wai representing Itang Anya-Nya II.
4. Popopiou representing paketa Anya-Nya II.

After the signing of unity agreement, the leaders of four factions groups could not agree on a leader to head the re-organized movement. After breaking away with his group, Akuot Atem de Mayen formed his own movement called united Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (USSLM).⁽¹⁾

The breaking away of Akuot Atem, paved the way for John Garang's faction to establish its own movement which became the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) under the leadership of Col. Dr. John Garang de Mabior. The founding members of the SPLM/SPLA, leadership was comprised of five military men and two civilians as follows:

1. Col. Dr. John Garang de Mabior as chairman and commander in-chief of SPLM/SPLA;
2. Lt. Colonel Kerubino Kuanyin Bol as deputy chairman;
3. Lt. Colonel William Myuon Bany member;
4. Major Salva Kiir Mayardit member;
5. Major Arok Thon Arok member;
6. Mr. Joseph Oduho secretary for foreign affairs;
7. Mr. Martin Majier Gai secretary for legal affairs.

(1) Deng, Gabriel, previous ref.

The manifesto of the Movement – SPLM:

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement was intending to transform Sudan into a new Sudan with new bases, it wanted to fight for the interest of all Sudanese irrespective of religion, race, creed and geographical diversities. The objective of the SPLM was to convert the Sudan into a new socialist United Sudan and democratic political system, in which every citizen can participate at his/her will without coercion⁽¹⁾.

The second civil war between the northern and southern Sudan continued from 1983 to 2004, and this war lasted for twenty-one years. It came to an end by a peace deal called comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was mediated by Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 2005. So, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on January 9, 2005, in Nairobi, Kenya, by the government of Sudan and Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA).⁽²⁾ The comprehensive peace agreement's terms established the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) in Juba with local self-rule authority for six years, after that Southern Sudan would decide its political fate through referendum. Under the CPA, the government of national unity was formed in the centre, in which all political forces and parties were represented including the major signatories of the CPA, the government of Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, and other political parties which were not signatories of the comprehensive peace agreement. The terms of peace deal were to establish and develop good governance, sharing of oil revenues between the central government and government of Southern Sudan and producing areas of oil fields. The timetable for the referendum was set. The implementation of the peace agreement did not go as stipulated in the agreement, but before the end of interim period, the referendum was conducted, and the people of Southern Sudan voted for independence of their region⁽³⁾.

On July 9, 2011, Southern Sudan became an independent State under the name Republic of South Sudan. On July 14, 2011, South Sudan admitted into sovereign nations and became 193rd member of the United Nations. On July 28, 2011, South Sudan joined the African Union as its 54th member state⁽⁴⁾.

(1) Ibid, p. 129.

(2) Ibid.

(3) [www.https://en.M.wikipedia.org,2011](https://en.M.wikipedia.org,2011), date of visit 4/1/2021 p.1

(4) Ibid.

Section Two:

Political and Military situation in the Republic of South Sudan:

A. Political situation in the Republic of South Sudan since Independence on July 9, 2011:

South Sudan became an independent state on July 9, 2011, under the clause of plebiscite for the people of South Sudan to determine their fate. After amending the constitution of Southern Sudan, the new interim constitution established presidential system, with three organs of governance, the executive, legislative and judiciary. The president is the head of state and government, the national legislature composed of two houses, national legislative assembly and council of states is the legislative body to enact laws, and the judiciary for adjudication. Upon independence, the incumbent president of Southern Sudan became president of the republic of South Sudan for a four-year term. Legislative powers were given to bicameral legislature, composing the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) and the council of states. The majority members of National Legislative Assembly, were members of the defunct Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, the rest were the former members of the Sudan Legislative Assembly who were elected from Southern Sudan constituencies and Southerners who were elected from Northern Sudan constituencies. The council of states composed of all South Sudanese who were elected from Southern Sudan legislatures of states in Southern Sudan during interim period plus twenty (20) members appointed by the president of South Sudan. The tenure of national assembly and council of states members were to be four years term⁽¹⁾.

After amending the constitution of Southern Sudan, the new interim constitution established presidential system, with three organs of governance, the executive, legislature and judiciary. The president is the head of state and government, the national legislature composed of two houses, national legislative assembly and council of states, and the judiciary.

The new government inherited ten states from Sudan and adopted semi federal system which it means as decentralized type of governance.

(1) <https://www.britannica.com> date of visit 22/1/2021, p.1.

When South Sudan became independent on July 9, 2011, Salva Kiir Mayardit was sworn in as president of new independent South Sudan and Dr. Riek Machar was appointed as Vice President. From July 2011 to July 2013, the two leaders worked smoothly without any problem, but they started dispute over leadership of the Party-Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement.

In July 2013, president Kiir dismissed the whole cabinet including vice president Riek Machar with the aim of reducing the size of government. That power struggle between Kiir and Machar led to the split of the movement-Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM).

On 15 December, 2013, fighting erupted in Juba between forces loyal to President Kiir and those loyal to Riek Machar. That fight spread to the countryside, leading to Civil War in South Sudan⁽¹⁾. The government deployed Ugandan Troops to fight rebels and as a result, the rebel forces were stopped from advancing to Juba. In January 2014, the ceasefire agreement was agreed, but fighting continued until August 2015, when negotiated peace agreement led by (IGAD) was reached in August 2015. Based on the terms of that agreement, Riek Machar was sworn in as First Vice President in 2016.

The peace agreement which was signed in August 2015, stipulated the establishment of a transitional power sharing agreement of national unity. The government of the peace deal signed in August 2015, created a coalition government in which all political parties participated according to their strength. The government of national unity included the incumbent ruling party – the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement – IO, former Detainees, other political parties. Based on the terms of the 2015 agreement, Riek Machar was appointed as First Vice President in 2016. The agreement stated that after the establishment of the transitional government, the regime had 90 days to convert the National Legislative assembly into the Transitional National Legislative Assembly in order to include members of the former national legislative assembly and additional 68 members from the opposing side. 50 members should be from Sudan People's Liberation Movement- IO, one (1) member from former political detainees, and seventeen members from other political parties. The council of states was not affected by the peace deal and it remained unchanged in the new Transitional government of national unity.

(1) Wikipedia <https://en.m.wikipedia.org>,p.3

Active parties in South Sudan are:

1. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM);
2. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM-IO);
3. The Union of Sudan African Party (USAP);
4. Sudan African National Union (SANU);
5. The South Sudan Democratic Forum (SSDF);
6. The United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF);
7. The National Congress Party (NCP)⁽¹⁾.

The August peace deal did not last and war erupted again in August 2016.

Following the second breakout of Civil Conflict in Juba , Riek Machar was replaced by Taban Deng Gai as First Vice President and war continued until peace mediated by IGAD was reached in Khartoum in August 2018. It was an effort of president Omer El-Bahir which made it possible to achieve peace in South Sudan. He framed a compromise peace deal which was accepted by both sides of the conflict, and final peace agreement was signed on Sept. 12, 2018, in Addis Ababa , Ethiopia. That peace agreement was named or termed as “Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)”⁽²⁾. It aimed to establishing a revitalized transitional government of national unity. The September peace agreement reconstituted the state institutions, including the legislature and executive bodies. The agreement stated the power-sharing among political players-parties. It divided parliamentary seats and cabinet portfolios between political forces. The parliamentary seats divided among political parties were five hundred and fifty (550) seats.

They were distributed as follows:

1. Incumbent transitional government of national unity (TGoNU) three hundred and thirty two (332) members.

(1) Ibid, p.2.

(2) ibid

2. Soudan People's Liberation Movement/Army- IO (SPLM/A-IO) one hundred and twenty eight (128) members;
3. South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) fifty (50) members;
4. Other political parties (OPP) thirty (30) members.
5. Former Detainees (FDs) ten (10) members.

The position of the speaker of the TNLA was given to the incumbent TGoNU, three deputies speaker of the transitional national legislative assembly were divided among SPLM/A-IO, the incumbent TGoNU and OPP. The second deputy speaker which was given to TGoNU must be a woman.

The council of ministers according to the September 2018, agreement composed of thirty five (35) ministries. They were distributed as follows:

1. Incumbent transitional government of national unity twenty (20) ministries;
2. Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army –IO, nine (9) ministries;
3. South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), three ministries;
4. Former Detainees (FDs), two ministries.
5. Other political parties (OPP), one ministry⁽¹⁾.

Formation of Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU):

After delays of 18 months since the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity was finally formed on February 22, 2020. The first vice president Riek Machar was sworn in along with four other vice presidents. The other four vice presidents were:

James Wani Igga, Taban Deng Gai, Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior and Hussein Abdlebagi Akol Agany. On March 12, 2020, the president appointed 35 ministers and 10 deputy ministers. The unity government composed 550 members of parliament, 10 governors of the ten states and three chief

(1) Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, (R-ARCSS), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, September 12, 2018, pp. 16, 20.

administrators of three administrative areas of Pibor, Abyei and Ruweng.

The task of Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU):

The Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) will execute the following issues:

1. Re-habilitation and reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees;
2. Facilitation of national reconciliation and healing;
3. Complete the process of making a permanent national constitution;
4. Consolidate peace and stability in South Sudan;
5. Proper management of public finances;
6. Ensure transparency in managing national resources;
7. Undertake civil service reforms;
8. Devise and execute security sector reforms;
9. Reconstruct and recover destroyed physical infrastructure;
10. Conduct national census;
11. Devolve powers and resources to state and local government levels⁽¹⁾.

The appointment of state governors and chief administrators of three administrative areas has been done except the Upper Nile State. The governors of nine states and three administrative areas are as follows:

1. Emmanuel Adil Anthony for Central Equatoria;
2. Louis Lobong Lojore for Eastern Equatoria;
3. Denay Jock Chagor for Jonglei state;
4. Makur Kulang for Lakes State;

(1) Clayton Hazvinei Vhumburu, The Formation of Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity in South Sudan, www.accord.org.za, February 2020, Pp. 1-2.

5. Tong Akeen Ngor for Northern Bahr el Ghazal;
6. Joseph Monytil for Unity State;
7. Bona Panek for Warrap State;
8. Sarah Cleto Rial for Western Bahr el Ghazal State;
9. Alfred Futiyu for Western Equatoria State.

Chief administrators of three administrative areas:

1. Kuol Deim Kuol for Abyei administrative area;
2. Joshua Konyi for Pibor area;
3. William Chol Awolich for Ruweng area.

The Upper Nile governor has not been appointed until moment of my writing⁽¹⁾.

B. Military Situation in the Republic of South Sudan:

When South Sudan obtained independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011, it inherited the guerrilla Army called the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) founded by Dr. John Garang De Mabior in 1983. The SPLA became regular army of the new born nation of South Sudan.

History of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA):

The Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) was established in 1983 as a result of the rebellion carried out by mutineers of two battalions , 105 and 104 of Bor and Pachala Garrisons respectively. These mutineers moved to Ethiopia in June 1983 and became the nucleus of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) . SPLA elected Dr. John Garang de Mabior to be its commander – in chief and chairman.

The Vision of the SPLA was to fight for a united and secular Sudan on a new basis in which all citizens are treated equally, irrespective of religion, race or region.

(1) List of current state governors in South Sudan and chief administrators, www.en.M.wikipedia.org, p.1.

In the village of Bilpam, Ethiopia, the first SPLA battalion was graduated in 1984 . In the mid-1980s the SPLA blocked development projects of the Sudan's Government such as the Jonglei Canal and the Bentiu Oil Fileds. The SPLA continued fighting the Sudan's successive governments until 2005, when the government of Sudan led by President Bashir signed comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLM/A) on January 9, 2005.

Following the signing of the CPA, the SPLA was reorganized. In 2005 the commander – in – chief Dr. John Garang restructured the top leadership of SPLA by establishing General staff headed by chief of General Staff, Lt. General Oyay Deng Ajak , and deputized by four deputies of General Staff and those were Maj.Gen. Salva Mathok Gengdit for administration, Maj. Gen. Bior Ajang Duot (Aswad) for operation, Maj. Gen. James Hoth Mai for Logistics, and Maj. Gen. Obuto Mamur Mete for Political and Moral Orientation⁽¹⁾.

The reorganization of the Sudan People's Liberation Army-SPLA was initiated in Mid-2005, and was put into practice in 2006 . The SPLA was divided into six divisions : in Upper Nile State there was 1st Division, Equatoria 2nd Division, 3rd Division in Northern Bahr e-Ghazal and Warrap States, 4th Division in Unity State , 5th Division in Lakes State, 6th Division – SPLA joint integrated units based in Maridi, and four independent brigades in Southern Blue Nile , Jonglei (Bor), The Nuba Mountains and Raja (Western Bahr el – Ghazal). In 2007 – 08 , the independent brigades in Blue Nile, Bor and the Nuba Mountains became the 10th , 8th and 9th divisions respectively. The last independent brigade in Raja became part of the 5th Division which was relocated to Wau.

In 2007, the SPLM/A led government established Ministry of SPLA Affairs . In May 2009, Deputy Chief of Staff , James Hoth Mai replaced Oyay Deng Ajak as Chief of General Staff⁽²⁾.

After independence, the SPLA leadership decided to restructure the army and transform it to a professional army. The Sudan People's Liberation Army.

(1) Wikipedia, <https://en.m.wikipedia.org>,p6

(2) *ibid*, p. 7

was renamed as South Sudan Defense forces (SSDF) in May 2017⁽¹⁾. In August 2017, Salva Kiir Mayardit declared that the new name for the army would be the South Sudan People's Defense Forces (SSPDF), in order to meet people's will. He said that there is a need to reorganize and professionalize the army for the sake of competency. The aim of changing the name was to restructure and change the doctrine of the army from liberation to national defense against foreign aggression. The army was officially renamed South Sudan People's Defense Forces (SSPDF) in September 2018, by a Republican order read over the state-owned Television (TV) channel South Sudan Broadcast Corporation (SSBC). The renaming happened ten days before execution of new security arrangements which include the reunification of the national army.

The army of South Sudan in 2018, was estimated as 185,000 soldiers, plus unknown number of South Sudan Air Force. Under the September 2018 peace accord, all armed factions in South Sudan were to assemble at designated sites for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into unified military and police forces. The unified forces were to be trained and deployed before the formation of national unity government.

In 2019, the South Sudan People's Defense Forces (SSPDF) composed the Ground Force, Air Force, Air Defense Forces and Presidential Guard.

Structure of the SPLA, SSDF:

Before the restructuring of the South Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF), the SPLA was commanded by the Chief of General Staff (COGS) Oyay Deng Ajak. He was followed or superseded by Deputy chief of staff for logistics, James Hoth Mai in 2009. James Hoth Mai was replaced by Paul Malong Awan in 2014.

After the restructure as South Sudan Defense Forces, Paul Malong Awan was replaced by James Ajongo Mawut in May 2017 until April 2018, as chief of defense forces. On April 28, 2018, chief of general staff James Ajongo Mawut died. He was superseded by general Gabriel Jok Riak on May 4, 2018.

(1) Radio Tamazuj, <http://radiotamazuj.org>, Juba, 3 August, 2017

On May 11, 2020, president Salva Kiir dismissed General Gabriel Jok Riak and appointed General Johnson Juma Okot as chief of defense forces⁽¹⁾.

Composition of the SPLA before the restructure:

The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was composed of five directorates, and each was led by a Deputy Chief of General Staff (DCOGS). The directorates of the SPLA were as follows:

1. Directorate of Administration;
2. Directorate of Operations;
3. Directorate of Logistics;
4. Directorate of Political and Moral Orientation;
5. Directorate of Training and Research.

The SPLA had nine divisions and air force. The divisions are:

1. 1st Division, located at Renk, Upper Nile State;
2. 2nd Division, at Giada Barracks, Juba, Central Equatoria established 2006, but relocated in 2013 to Mogiri east of Juba;
3. 3rd Division, Akuem, Northern Bahr el Ghazal;
4. 4th Division, at Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal, it was originally at Rubkona, Unity State in 2006;
5. 5th Division, at Girinti Barracks, Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal State;
6. 6th Division, at Maridi, Western Equatoria;
7. 7th Division, at Owachi, Upper Nile State;
8. 8th Division, located at Bor, Jonglei State;
9. 9th Mechanized Division, located at Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal State.

(1) Ibit, pp. 41-46.

There is special forces brigade with four battalions and there is Air force located at Juba, Central Equatoria State⁽¹⁾.

In September 12, 2018, peace agreement stated that there shall be established a unified professional army and other organized forces, such as police, national security, wildlife and prisons warden. According to the agreement, all forces shall be screened and classified to known Military criteria for the purposes of recruitment and also other organized forces will be screened and trained for redeployment. Ineligible persons shall be demobilized and demilitarized.

Training of the unified forces of the military, police and other organized forces shall start at the beginning of the pre-transitional period, and continue through the transitional period. Building of the national army, police, national security and other organized forces shall be completed before the end of the transitional period.

By the end of the transitional period, the national army and other organized forces shall be redeployed throughout the Republic of South Sudan.

All the Heads of Opposition Armed groups shall continue as commanders-in-chief of their forces until the end of the pre-transitional period or until the end of the unification process.

The Joint Defense Board (JDB) shall be formed at the level of chiefs of staff and Directors General of National Security, police and all other organized forces to command and control over all forces during the pre-transitional period.

The Joint Transitional Security Committee (JTSC) shall be formed at the national level⁽²⁾.

(1) Ibid. pp. 45-54.

(2) Reviisid Agreement on the Resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, Addis Ababa, September 12, 2018, pp. 35-37.

Section Three:

Economic, Social and Cultural Situation in The Republic of South Sudan:

1. Economic situation in South Sudan :-

South Sudan economy is considered as one of the weakest and under developed in the world. As a new nation South Sudan has small existing infrastructure and lacks electricity and running water in most cities and rural areas . The maternal mortality and female illiteracy rates is the highest in the world as assumed in 2011. South Sudan has only 10,000 Kilometers of paved roads.

(A) Resources of South Sudan:

South Sudan has abundant resources, such resources include Oil, Iron ore , Copper, Zinc , Silver , Gold, Hydropower.. etc . South Sudan exports timber to international market . The states which have teaks plantation and natural trees for timber are in Western and Central Equatoria States. The most important sources of national income is petroleum, but the country is heavily dependent on agriculture as the majority of population relies on agricultural produce⁽¹⁾.

The national budget of South Sudan depends on Oil revenue. Before independence , South Sudan produced 85% of Sudan's Oil Produce. The Oil revenues during the transition period according to the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) were to be shared and divided equally between the North and South Sudan. After independence , South Sudan relies heavily on Oil revenues, which constitutes 95% of national budget. (35)

Oil industry is controlled by foreign based consortium , which include, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) with 40% share, Petronas of Malaysia with 30% , Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (India) With 25% and Nile Pet of South Sudan with 5%⁽²⁾.

(1) Economy of South Sudan", World Economic outlook, Wikipedia ,Sept. 29, 2019 , p3

(2) ibid.

(B) Agriculture:

South Sudan has very fertile agricultural land in the world and considerable number of pastoralists. The United Nations Agency , Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) conducted land survey that showed only 4.5 percent of the available land was under cultivation when South Sudan gained independence. The government of South Sudan has started to solve the issue of agriculture and food security. It hopes to attract agricultural investors such as Gulf Arab States, Israel, China, Netherlands and other African Countries in order to boost production of basic food such as sugar, sorghum rice, cereal , oil seed, and cotton.

Economic development in South Sudan was interrupted by Civil War in 2013 , but after the signing of Revitalized peace agreement of Sept. 12, 2018, the economy is improving. After Four years of decrease , South Sudan's economy appears to be recovering and has reached 3.2 percent in Fiscal year 2018 – 2019. According to the World Bank's economic update, the economy of South Sudan is still affected by high inflation which stood at 170 percent in 2019⁽¹⁾.

Dividends from the peace agreement has reduced conflict in certain areas across the country , and led to slight recovery in non-oil sectors . Growth in the Oil and Mining Sectors was estimated 10.7 percent, services sector is estimated 0.4 percent, while agriculture is estimated to have decreased by 2.5 percent⁽²⁾.

Real Growth Domestic Product (GDP) was estimated 5.38% in 2019. That result was because of reopening of some oil fields in Unity and Upper Nile States , and the signing of peace agreement in September 2018. The Oil sector remains the main source of income and agriculture is the second source of national income⁽³⁾.

Industry and infrastructure in South Sudan are underdeveloped and poverty is widespread following years of Civil War with Sudan. Continued fighting within South Sudan is disrupting economy. Majority of population depends

(1) press release, April2, 2020" World Bank.org

(2) Ibid.

(3) South Sudan Economic Outlook" <https://www.afdb.org/encyclopedia>)

on subsistence of agriculture and humanitarian support . South Sudan has poor infrastructure, only 2% of roads is paved. Electricity is produced by diesel generators. About 90% of consumed goods and services are imported from neighboring countries, such as Uganda, Sudan and Kenya⁽¹⁾.

The main investor in South Sudan is China . China plays a major role in the infrastructure and energy sectors . China has a bigger share in Oil industry.

2. Social and Cultural Diversity in South Sudan:-

(i) Ethnic diversity:

South Sudan is a diverse society where many ethnic groups exist and reside in their ancestral land . There re sixty four (64) tribes in South Sudan with different languages, culture and religions. Tribes of South Sudan include⁽²⁾: -

1. Dinka (Jeing) resides in Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile Regions.
2. Nuer (Naath) resides in Greater Upper Nile Region.
3. Azande, is a third ethnic group which resides in Western Equatorial.
4. Bari, resides in central Equatoria.
5. Shilluk (Collo) , resides in Upper Nile.
6. Toposa, lives in Eastern Equatoria.
7. Madi, resides in Eastern Equatoria.
8. Acholi, Residesw in Eastern Equatoria.
9. 9Didinga, in Estern Equatoria.
10. Pojullo ,in Central Equatoria.
11. Anyuak, lieves in Greater Upper Nile.
12. Lotuka , in Eastern Equatoria.
13. Lango in Eastern Equatoria.,
14. Lopit , lives in Eastern Equatoria.
15. Murle, resides in Jonglei State of Greater Upper Nile .

(1) <https://Theodora.com>, source:2020 CIA World Facebook

(2) Biar D'chol Biar, list of South Sudan 64 tribes <https://biaraweng.wordpress.com>. January 17, 2017, p. 1.

16. Maban resides in Upper Nile .
17. Uduk resides in Upper Nile .
18. Balanda Boor, lives in Western Bahr el –Gazal.
19. Bongo , lives in Warrap and Western Bahr el Ghazal
20. Jur Chol (Luo) resides in Greater Bahr el-Gazal.
21. Kuku, resides in Central Equatoria.
22. Moro , resides in central Western Equatoria .
23. Ndogo lives in Western Bahre el-Gazal .
24. Kakwa, resides , in Central Equatoria .
25. Mundari, resides , in Central Equatoria .
26. Feroqhe, in Western Bahr el-Gazal.
27. Boya , in Eastern Equatoria.
28. Golo lives in Western Bahr el-Gaza.
29. Avukaya, resides in Central Equatoria.
30. Keliko, inhabits in Central Equatorisa.
31. Adio (Makaraka).
32. Aja;
33. Atuot (Reel);
34. Bai;
35. Baka;
36. Balanda-Bviiri;
37. Banda;
38. Binga;
39. Falata (Arab Nomads);
40. Imatong;
41. Indri;
42. Jiye (Jie);
43. Jur (Beli & Modo);

44. Kara;
45. Lokoya;
46. Lugbara;
47. Lulubo;
48. Mananger (Jur Mananger);
49. Mangayat;
50. Moro Kodo;
51. Mundu;
52. Ngulngule;
53. Nyangwara;
54. Nyangatom;
55. Pari;
56. Sere;
57. Shatt;
58. Suri (Kachipo);
59. Tid;
60. Woro;
61. Yulu;
62. Lokoro;
63. Dongotona;
64. Tenet.

(ii) Cultural and Language diversity:

The official language in South Sudan is English , but there are over 60 indigenous languages spoken in South Sudan, such languages are classified under the Nilo-Saharan language family, they include Nile Sudanic and Central Sudanic⁽¹⁾.

(1) "Culture of South Sudan" , [Wikipedia](#)

The Nilotic peoples compose the majority of the population of South Sudan , which include Dinka, Nuer , Shilluk, Toposa and Luo Peoples . The Nilotic groups are pastoralists people , who keep cattle as wealth to be paid or used as dowry⁽¹⁾. Non-Nilotic People in South Sudan include the Azande, Didinga, Murle, Moru, Madi and Balanda⁽²⁾.

(iii) Religious diversity:

The majority of population in South Sudan follow Christianity, African Traditional beliefs and Islam⁽³⁾.

(1) “Demographic of South Sudan”, [Wikipedia](#), p.6

(2) *ibid*

(3) “Nilotic Peoples” , en.m.wikipedia.org, p. 1

Chapter Three

Crises in the Republic Of South Sudan

Chapter Three

Crises in the Republic of South Sudan

Section One:

Impact of political and military crises on state building in South Sudan:

The intermingling of political and military wings of the Sudan People Liberation Movement and Sudan People's Liberation Army SPLM/A in South Sudan's politics has affected state building and smooth political process and stability of the country. The combination and intermingling of political and military institutions of the SPLM/A goes back to the establishment of the movement in 1983. When SPLM/A was founded, there was no separation of powers between the political and military wings of the movement. So, political and military wings were combined under one leadership headed by Colonel John Garang De Mabior. Such amalgamation ended theoretically when comprehensive peace agreement was signed in 2005, but remained partially in the mind of political and military elites of the SPLM/A.

When South Sudan got its independence in 2011, the two wings of the movement continued to dominate the political process. The new state and its regime is dominated by military elite, whether within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Sudan People's Liberation Army – SPLM/A or in the ranks of its South Sudanese militias who fought besides Sudan Armed Force (SAF) against SPLM/A during civil war. This elite is crumbling and apparent by competing patronist networks organized mainly “along ethnic and tribal lines”⁽¹⁾. The principal actors in South Sudanese politics since independence are the SPLM/A.

(1) Wolfram Lacher, South Sudan: International State Building and its limits, stiftung Wissenschaft und politik, Berlin, Feb. 2012.

Whereas conflicting interests are checked and maintained by small cluster around President Salva Kiir, the government is vulnerable to demands of many competing bands and so open to corruption patronage. That political connection hampers leadership in South Sudan to pursue steady policy for development.

Aftermath of independence, the government of the Republic of South Sudan, was formed, in which Salva Kiir became president and Riek Machar became vice president. The two men – president, his vice president and their immediate associates created uncontested power centre. There were no rival power centres and no strong opposition party to challenge it. The decision-making centre composes of competing factions which included President Salva Kiir, vice president Riek Machar and absorbed militias' leaders such as Paulino Matip, Alfred Ladu Gore, Celement Wani Konga, Ismail Konye and Sultan Abdel Bagi Ayii Akol.

The military elite did not step aside from politics, it continued playing a role in the affairs of the country. Eight of the ten state governors elected in April 2010 were military officers during liberation war. Many ministers and parliamentarians have military background, so majority of SPLM members were military officers and therefore, they were accepted as part of ruling elite. Conflicting interests and diversity of ideological thinking led to disagreement in dealing with state policies. The real SPLM elements wanted to execute the programme of the movement, but the militia's leaders wanted to accumulate wealth and create power centres for themselves. That wrangling for influence and gains has culminated into current political instability and socio-economic crisis⁽¹⁾.

Immediately after independence, South Sudan embarked on development projects, such as agricultural projects, roads, health, education, social and human development, economic, conflict prevention and maintenance of security.

The political process in South Sudan was smooth during two years following independence in 2011, but intra-party rivalry within the ruling party (the Sudan People's Liberation Movement) paralyzed the functioning of the government. The wrangling for political supremacy in the party led to the current political crisis, and therefore, hindered political development.

(1) Ibid.

The crisis started when President Salva Kiir sacked his vice Dr. Riek Machar in July 2013, followed by the suspension of secretary general of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) Mr. Pagan Amum. Unhappiness of influential leaders within the SPLM culminated into fighting on 15th December 2013, in the capital Juba, between forces loyal to president and those loyal to his vice president, such fighting spread into country side to include Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states⁽¹⁾.

Political crisis in South Sudan which culminated into fighting on December 15, 2013, was caused by power struggle between two wings of the SPLM, led by Salva Kiir and Riek Machar. Causes of political rift can be summed up as follows:

1. The wounds- memories of the 1991 split.
2. Weakness of political system.
3. Impact of 2010 elections.
4. Absence of strong political opposition.
5. Unreliable neighbours.

Causes of political crisis in detail:

A. The wounds and memories of the 1991 split have not forgotten in the minds of Kiir's group. Such memories have been hunting Salva Kiir ever since 1991. The rift of 1991, has become hysteria in the minds of Salva Kiir and his group. When the SPLM convention was convened in December 2013, the issue of leadership competition arose. The modalities of political transfer of power were lacking and not clear in the SPLM institution. Lack of institutionalization of political process and disrespect of rules governing the game of political competition are the causes of current political crisis.

What started as a political struggle within the party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), re-inflamed factional fighting within the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), in December 2013. The crisis within the political and military wings of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

(1) Israel Nyaburi Nyadera, South Sudan conflict from 2013-2018, Rethinking the causes, situation and solutions, [https://:www.Researchgate.net](https://www.Researchgate.net), December 2018, 9.8.

(SPLM/A), originated in the unresolved strains-tensity after the split in the SPLM/A in the 1990s and the unfinished incorporation of opposing factions into the army following the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in 2005.

The comprehensive peace agreement was composed or built around the assumption that Dr. John Garang would remain the chairman of the SPLM/A, the head of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) and the first vice president in the power-sharing government of national unity (GNU) with the national congress party (NCP) during the interim period which would last at the referendum for Southern Sudan to decide whether remain in union with Northern Sudan or vote for independence. The sudden death of Dr. John Garang in July 2005, elevated two gentlemen, Salva Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar into unexpected positions of power. Salva Kiir became the chairman of the SPLM party and vice president of the president of the Sudan, and also assumed the position of president of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), while Dr. Riek Machar became the vice president of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS)⁽¹⁾.

Following assumption of the SPLM leadership, Salva Kiir faced numerous challenges in establishing a government of Southern Sudan to administer the region during the interim period before referendum could take place. As leader of the party, the government and commander-in-chief of SPLA, he appointed people closer to himself, leaving out those persons who were assumed to be Garang's supporters.

The SPLM's political vision under Salva Kiir, redirected from Garang's vision of a new Sudan which would be based on a new basis as a united secular and democratic state, toward the independence of Southern Sudan. To achieve that objective of gaining independence of Southern Sudan, SPLM candidate for presidential election was withdrawn from contesting the 2010 presidential election. The SPLA deployed in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states were abandoned.

After independence, power struggle became visible and articulate. Discontent within the SPLM appeared and prominent figures in the party voiced their dissatisfaction with the leader of the SPLM, Salva Kiir Mayardit. Dr. Riek

(1) Douglas H. Johnson, Political crisis in South Sudan, Cambridge.org, December 2, 2014, p. 1.

Machar had declared his intention to become president of the independence South Sudan as early as 2008. He emphasized presidential term limit to be written into the transitional constitution, but the new constitution gave the president more powers.

Dissatisfaction with the lack of development, corruption within the party and the government, and continued insecurity in many areas of the country became visible in 2012-2013 as the party was preparing to hold its national convention for the ratification of its governing documents-constitution. The national convention of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement was scheduled to be held in May 2013. Ambiguity about intention of Salva Kiir to stand for reelection motivated Riek Machar, Rebecca Nyandeng and Pagan Amum, the secretary-general of the SPLM to declare their intention to contest election for the party chairmanship. Many officials in the party supported proposed reforms raised by Riek Machar.

Relation between the president and vice president worsened, and the president felt isolated within the party. To save his position, the president started a series of steps during the first half of 2013: He stripped Riek Machar of his delegated powers, removed many critics from position of power within the government, dismissed Taban Deng Gai, as governor of the oil producing Unity State. By July, he dismissed Riek Machar as vice president, dissolved the entire cabinet and suspended Pagan Amum, the secretary-general of the SPLM. In November, he dissolved all political organs of the SPLM except the chairmanship and the secretariat. Those steps deprived the president's critics of their position in the government and in the party.

The new government of Salva Kiir after July move, included many elements who were not members of the SPLM, people who had no real power base in the party. The dismissals created a new alliance of internal opposition within the party. Riek Machar became the figurehead of dissidents, and included former governors of Unity State, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes states; defeated gubernatorial candidate from Central Equatoria Mr. Alfred Lado Gori; former ministers like Deng Alor Kuol and senior officers in the army.

On December 6, 2013, the dissidents held a press conference criticizing Salva Kiir about the handling of the party affairs and government. They urged the president to call a meeting of the SPLM political Bureau and announced a public opposition rally to be held in Juba on December 14, 2013. To counteract

that announcement, the SPLM secretariat declared that a meeting of the national Liberation Council would take place on the same date-December 14, 2013. The dissidents postponed the public rally and joined the meeting of the National Liberation Council. The meeting was opened by the president, and in his opening speech, the president attacked Riek Machar and reminded the audience of Riek's role in the split of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in 1990s. The proposed motions which were tabled by the dissident group for consideration were rejected and that act led them to boycott the meeting the next day when the party's constitution was passed.

At the final days of the meeting, two contenders emerged for leadership contest, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar. Kiir's group won the game through political manoeuvre. That tactics did not satisfy Riek's wing of the SPLM party, and on 15 December fighting erupted in the capital Juba, between forces loyal to president Salva Kiir and those loyal to vice president Riek Machar.

On December 15, the president ordered the disarmament of the presidential guard, and that action led to the outbreak of fighting between mostly Nuer and Dinka soldiers in Giada garrison and spread to the rest of garrisons in Juba. That fight in Juba which started as a political misunderstanding between conflicting factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement spread into countryside and culminated into civil war in the country⁽¹⁾.

B. Weakness of political system. The government of South Sudan inherited weak institutions from Sudan. There were no trained civil servants and no well-established institutions. Civil service institution was politicized and tribalized, so employment was based on nepotism and tribalism. Lack of rules governing staffing of civil servants led to preference in recruiting relatives in civil service, and therefore, caused discontent among people of South Sudan.

C. Impact of 2010 elections. The elections of 2010 witnessed disagreement among SPLM cadres regarding who to contest for SPLM ticket. Many contenders within the party SPLM decided to run as independents. So another component of disagreement in the procedure of state building is the impact of 2010 elections on connection among SPLM political contenders in

(1) Ibid, pp. 2-5.

South Sudan. The effect of the elections saw rifts in the ranks and files of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement members. Some disappointed candidates in the 2010 elections rebelled and formed their breakaway movements and the government of Sudan supplied them with weapons. Those rebel groups started fighting the government forces in Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity states. No attention was paid to solve the problem of renegades of the party. The party – SPLM leadership opted for militarism to resolve this issue of independents who lost election and took up arms.

D. Absence of strong political opposition: The weakness of political opposition has its role in the continuation of political instability in the country. Many opposition political parties engaged in fighting over positions in government. When there is no strong opposition, the people adopt policy of wait and see, because they cannot change the government and party in power without a strong political party or alternative⁽¹⁾.

When politicians split the SPLM into two factions, the army – the Sudan People's Liberation Army joined the fight and each faction of the SPLA backed the wing it thought addressed its interests, so the SPLA was split along ethnic and tribal lines. Such composition of the army based on tribal basis, cannot protect the interests of the nation, and such behavior impedes progress and political development .

E. Unreliable neighbours:

South Sudan is neighbouring six countries, and among those countries, Sudan and Uganda have been interfering in internal affairs of South Sudan since its independence in 2011. Sudan and national congress party (NCP) in particular has undeclared policy of destabilizing South Sudan and that policy was to divide South Sudanese along ethnic lines on the basis of creating enmity between Nuer and Dinka, the major two tribes in South Sudan.

Sudan intends to weaken South Sudan because of unresolved issues such as border, Abyei issue and oil pipeline. In recent years, South Sudan has been intending to construct alternative pipeline for oil transportation, either through Kenya or Ethiopia. This idea threatens economic interest of Sudan,

(1) Samson, Wassara, Predictable causes and prospects of the current political crisis in South Sudan. <https://blogs.ise.ac.uk/africatlse/2014/04/18,pp. 2-3>.

and therefore, Sudan is adamant not to allow such project to succeed in South Sudan.

When civil war erupted in South Sudan, Sudan supplied military assistance to the rebels. On the other hand, Uganda supported government of South Sudan and sent Ugandan army to fight on the side of government. So, South Sudan will not be stable if Sudan and Uganda do not stop their interfering in South Sudan's internal politics .

Consequences of political crisis:

When the civil war broke in December 2013, the whole country was affected, and civil population was displaced in Jonglei state, Upper Nile and Unity states. Some people fled into exile in neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan. Other civilians sought refuge in the compounds of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). In 2018, reports by the mercy corps registered that 1 out of 3 people in South Sudan is refugee, 1.9 million people are displaced internally, while more than 2.1 million have gone into exile.

In many parts of the country, attacks on civilians, rape, burning of houses and livestock, killing and kidnapping continued unabated.

According to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), around 50% of children eligible for school are out of school. Fighting affected the whole population including farmers and traders. When the civil war erupted, the country was not adequately to face unexpected challenges, because it was a new born nation with less experience to solve its problems⁽¹⁾.

Section Two:

Impact of economic crisis on state building :

The economy of South Sudan is the one of the weakest and underdeveloped in the world. South Sudan has bad infrastructure, less paved roads. Many towns and villages lack electricity, running clean water.

(1) Israel Nyaburi Nyadera, South Sudan conflict from 2013 – 2018 Rethinking the causes, situation and solution. <http://www.researchgate.net>, December, 2018, p3.

South Sudan is supposed to be rich country, but mismanagement has hindered economic development. In South Sudan, there are many resources, which include oil, agriculture and other minerals such as gold, iron and copper. The economy of South Sudan should basically rely on agriculture, because agricultural produce include cotton, groundnuts, sorghum, gum Arabic, mangos, papaya, banana, sweet potatoes and sesame, but the country is heavily relying oil revenues. Oil revenues amount to 98% of the government of the South Sudan budget. South Sudan is rich in agricultural land and has large quantity of animals like cattle, goats and sheep.

In spite of being rich in agricultural land, South Sudan import most of food stuffs from outside the country⁽¹⁾.

Economic challenges facing South Sudan development:

South Sudan inherited at the time of independence a weak economy. The economy of South Sudan relies on oil production, and such commodity cannot cover all expenses of development. Major challenges facing the economy of South Sudan can be summed up as follows:

1. Fluctuations in oil production and oil prices.
2. Inflation.
3. Shortage of foreign-hard currency.
4. Depreciation of national currency.
5. Trade imbalance.
6. Increased expenditure on security.
7. Lack of proper infrastructure.
8. Illicit trade in timber and minerals.

(1) Economy of South Sudan, <https://www.wikipedia.net>, date of visit 4/1/2021, pp.2,4,6.

Economic challenges in details:

1. Fluctuations in oil production and oil prices:

Exploitation of oil since 1999 changed the behavior and policy of South Sudan from relying on agriculture to rely on oil. At the time of independence, oil reserve was estimated at 3.75 billion barrels. Because South Sudan is relying on oil as its only export commodity, it has been affected by fluctuations in oil production, global demand and world prices. Frequent interruption in oil production had caused fluctuations. In 2012, disagreement between Sudan and South Sudan over oil revenue sharing compelled South Sudan to shut down oil production, which decreased the economy by 51.5%.

In December 2013, and July 2016, war erupted following internal bickering over SPLM leadership, influencing oil and agricultural production⁽¹⁾.

Fluctuations in international oil prices affect economy of South Sudan. In July 2015, international oil prices declined when oil production in South Sudan decreased and the country was coping with high inflation and devaluation of the South Sudanese pound. Vacillation in oil revenue has affected South Sudanese budget. Between 2006 and 2008, there was an increase in government revenue from \$1.2 billion in 2006 to \$ 2.6 billion in 2008 and \$3.3 billion in 2011/2012 before oil production shut down in 2012. At the time of independence, South Sudan had a budget surplus, but in 2015/2016 oil revenue net of transfers dropped down to \$500 million, because of the decline of oil prices and production globally. The fall of oil prices and corona virus pandemic have affected the weak economy of South Sudan⁽²⁾.

2. Inflation:

After independence, South Sudan inflation increased quickly, and the closure of oil production added more problems. Since 2012, South Sudan has been facing high inflation. When oil production was shut down, South Sudan's pound depreciated and become worthless compare to foreign currencies. Such devaluation led to the rise of prices of goods, because food and building materials are imported from outside the country.

(1) The political economy of South Sudan, African Development group, August 2018, p.10.

(2) Benjamin Takping, world economy, Africa, www.africa.com.tr/africa, p.1

Causes of inflation:

- a. Devaluation of South Sudan's pound. Depreciation of currency led to inflation, because value of pound became worthless compare to dollar. Since the weakening of South Sudan's pound against dollar, goods prices have increased.
- b. Supply side effect: When South Sudan separated in 2011, goods used to enter into South Sudan without restriction, but after the closure of oil production, Sudan imposed border restriction and banned entry of goods to South Sudan, such action from Sudan affected the flow of goods to South Sudan and led to rise of prices in the market. Another element affecting prices in the market is the existence of many roads check and blocks along trade route, which increase prices of goods.
- c. Huge government expenditure: The government of South Sudan spends more money to run huge administration, and with the lack of resources, it turns into deficit, which led to inflation⁽¹⁾.

3. Shortage of foreign-hard currency:

South Sudan has run out of foreign reserves, due to the rapid rise of fiscal budget. The government has no resources and commodities that can generate hard currency. The only produce which can earn hard currency is oil, but decrease of oil production and decline of its prices has affected the availability of hard currency. Lack of hard currency has led to the depreciation of local currency and consequent increase of prices in the market.

It has been confirmed by deputy governor of central bank of South Sudan that there is no reserves cash in the bank. The deputy governor of central bank, Daniel Kech Pouch said:

“It's difficult for us, now at this moment to stop this rapid exchange rate because we don't have the (foreign) reserves for us to intervene in the market”⁽²⁾.

(1) World Bank, poverty and economic management network (PREM), South Sudan, 2012, pp., 1, 5-8.

(2) David Mono Danga, VOA news.com, August 20,2020.

4. Depreciation of local currency:

The fixed exchange rate was dropped in December 2015, permitting the South Sudanese pound to float. The abrupt decline in oil production and fall in oil prices caused deficits in foreign receipts and government revenue. The result of the depreciation of local currency – the pound was the lost of its value and it lost more than 95% of the value against the dollar (US\$) in December 2016, and by January 2018, the pound had fallen to South Sudan pound – SSP 131 to the US\$ from SSP 1.154 to the US\$ - US dollar in march 2013, that means, in 2013, US dollar was equivalent to SSP 1.154, in other words one US dollar was pound and fifteen piaster in 2013, before floating exchange rate. Depreciation continues unabated till today, and it has been harming the life of South Sudanese because of the sharp increase of commodities prices⁽¹⁾.

5. Trade imbalance:

South Sudan exports crude oil, forage crops, Raw cotton, Gold, Dried legumes and timber. South Sudan imports are cars, raw sugar, delivery trucks, cereal flours, palm oil⁽²⁾.

In 2018, main imported items were vehicles – cars (24.67% of total exports), machinery (7.54%), electrical appliances (7.11%), plastics (5.26%), pharmaceuticals (6.17%) and beverages (4.09%). The country primarily exported oil (95.58%) of total exports. In 2018, South Sudan imported goods for \$154.8 million, while it exported for \$1.6 billion (USD), resulting in trade surplus of \$1.46 billion⁽³⁾.

According to the World Bank, South Sudan's balance of trade posted a "surplus" of USD 893 million in 2018 after a deficit of USD 1.135 billion in 2014. In 2018, exports of services arrived USD 217 million (+11%), while imports amounted to USD 596 million (+7%). So, South Sudan has been experiencing trade imbalance since 2014⁽⁴⁾.

(1) The political Economy of South Sudan, African Development Bank Group, August 2018, p.15.

(2) South Sudan (SSD) Exports, Import and Trade partners, <https://DEL.world>.

(3) Country Risk of South Sudan: International trade, import-export. Societegerade,2020.

(4) Ibid.

6. Increased expenditure on security:

Security expenditure has been increasing since independence. In 2012, Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) had 230,000 troops, in addition 80,000 in other organized forces such as police, prisons and wildlife. Expenditure on security in the 2017/2018 budget were estimated to be 21% the total budget. By the time of the oil production closure in 2012, the security payroll amounted 58% of total government expending⁽¹⁾.

Salaries of security personnel are estimated about 50% every year from 2011 – 2014, and rose to 75% from 2014-2018 .

7. Lack of proper infrastructure:

Many years of civil war in South Sudan, primarily hindered the delivery of primary infrastructure and that sabotaged much of its production ability. South Sudan relies on goods imported from outside and if there are no proper roads, then life becomes miserable. About 80% of South Sudan's population resides in rural areas, and so, the lack of basic infrastructure for quite a long time has been a critical obstacle to the development of agricultural land.

Only 2% of the current existing roads in South Sudan is paved, but the majority of roads are inaccessible during rainy seasons, making it hard for rural population to take their produce or goods to market centres in the country⁽²⁾.

8. Illicit Trade in timber and minerals:

In South Sudan illegal selling and logging of timber has been practiced unabated since independence. Rebels and government military commanders have been doing illicit logging and selling of timber and mahogany trees in central and eastern Equatoria States.

It has been reported by UN panel of experts that Maj. Gen. Moses Lokujo, commander of SPLA.IO, Division 2B was "involved in taxation of teak and mahogany" in some Payams of former river state. The report said Moses Lokujo has been transporting logs to the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(1) The political Economy of South Sudan, African Development Bank Group, August 2018, p. 14.

(2) Major challenges facing the South Sudan economy, www.afdb.org, pp 34-35.

– DRC, and Uganda. According to the UN panel, timber traders pay the SPLA.IO \$600 – six hundred US dollar for the right to log and eight hundred (\$800) US dollars for transportation through territories under its controlled⁽¹⁾.

A Kenyan journalist, John – Allan Namu, revealed to the world that Frank Matata, the SPLM-IO governor of Former Yei River State was profoundly embroiled in unlawful logging and loading of teak trees and other unlawful activities like gold mining⁽²⁾.

Brokers did smuggle gold out of South Sudan to be sold in Uganda and Kenya at the amount of \$35 (dollars). Deputy governor of former Kapoeta State, Paul Langa acknowledged to South Sudan in focus that it is “difficult to control illicit mining of gold in the state, because is everywhere in state”⁽³⁾.

Solution for economic crisis in South Sudan:

Various institutions, including World Bank, government and political forces have been trying to find solution for the recovery of economy in South Sudan. The World Bank carried a research and come out with suggestions that if South Sudan wants to resolve economic crisis, it has to address the following points:

1. Handling the fundamental causes of conflict and peace and stability in South Sudan;
2. Implementing total macro-economic reforms, including measures to unify the exchange rate in the market, reduce inflation and diversify the economy;
3. Improving budget transparency, providing regular and accurate information on revenue, spending, arrears debt and budget execution;
4. Increasing allocations and investment for service delivery, especially in education, health and rural development .

(1) Lasuba Meno, South Sudan: Rebels, Government trade in illegal timber sales- report, [https://allafrica.com-vice of America](https://allafrica.com-vice-of-America) (Washington, DC), 27 November 2019, pp.1-2.

(2) Dr. Lako Jada Kwajok, The Teak mafla of South Sudan, <https://rediotmagazine.org>, 19 October, 2018, p.1

(3) Dimo Silva Aurelio, <https://www.voanews.com>, December 13, 2017, p.2.

To address economic crisis in South Sudan, a lecturer at the University of Juba suggests that peace should be restored in order to pave the way for goods production internally. He urges minister of finance, Athian Diig Athian to end government corruption⁽¹⁾.

Searching for economic recovery, the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the conflict in South Sudan (RARCSS) has resolved the following steps for the recovering of economy⁽²⁾:

1. The Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) shall undertake economic and financial reforms;
2. The RTGoNU should take institutional reforms as priority and that reforms should include Bank of South Sudan (BOSS). The September 2018, peace agreement stated that the RTGoNU shall review legislation governing the Bank of South Sudan in order to restructure and enable it to render efficient and effective service;
3. The Bank of South Sudan shall be responsible for formulating monetary policy, promoting price stability, issuing currency, regulating the financial sector;
4. The Bank of South Sudan should be headed by a competent and qualified governor;
5. Adopt comprehensive reforms to improve its supervisory and regulatory functions and prudential regulatory roles;
6. The Bank of South Sudan should have nine (9) members, at least three (3) shall be women, appointed by the president in consultation and agreement with the first vice president and the vice presidents;
7. The agreement directed the ministry of finance and planning to carry out economic review and implement the strategic economic development road map in order to achieve a sustainable and resilient national economy;
8. Ensure that all public financial and budgetary commitments by the RTGoNU are transparent, competitive and in accordance with the laws of

(1) <https://www.worldBank.org,Juba,April2,2020>.

(2) David Mono Danga, Lisa Schein, South Sudan in Focus, <https://www.voanews.com,September23,2020,p.2>

South Sudan and internationally accepted norms for the management of public finance;

9. Ensure sustainability of public finances across all levels of government;
10. Ensure that the national budget and the budget at each level of government addresses national priorities;
11. Within nine (9) months of the transitional period, review the constituency development Fund (CDF) programme in accordance with the R-ARCSS.

Section Three:

Impact of social and cultural diversity on state building:

The Republic of South Sudan is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural state entity, consisting of sixty four (64) tribes. While this diversity in South Sudan enriches the country's national heritage, it has become a source of internal ethnic disagreement. Since independence of South Sudan in 2011, the country has been witnessing inter-ethnic disputes arising from conflicts caused by grazing land, cattle raiding and access to natural resources. Despite of sixty four tribes residing in South Sudan, the major inter-ethnic competitions are limited to the main ethnic groups of the Dinka, Nuer and Murle.

The difference views and methods of the Nuer and Dinka who were the dominant groups in the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army during the civil war between the North and Southern Sudan gives a reference position for South Sudan's current ethnic discords. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army fight against the government of Sudan was to liberate then Southern Sudan. To fight the war of liberation, two conflicting views emerged; the faction led by Dr. John Garang De Mabior and backed by the majority of Dinka ethnic group called for the liberation of the whole Sudan which will be a united and democratic, secular state and equality of all citizens irrespective of race, religion and colour. The other faction led by Samuel Gai Tut and Akuot Atem de Mayen was supported by majority Nuer ethnic group. This group envisioned the liberation of Southern Sudan, where the South becomes independent country. That difference of views culminated into split within the movement in 1991. The splinter group led by Dr. Riek Machar Teny

called for the independence of Southern Sudan. Such disagreements led to general turmoil between divided groups of Nuer and Dinka populations. These prolonged ethnic divergences not only interrupted economic, social and political relations between the Southern Sudan communities before independence of South Sudan, but have kept going to plant seeds of discordance between the local communities after South Sudan became independent country⁽¹⁾.

Ethnic dispute in South Sudan continues as one of the main problems affecting the country's transition to state building. The main hindrance to national unity is exclusion from the national podium, particularly exclusion based on ethnic principle. Other challenges facing the government of South Sudan include corruption, nepotism and prevention from getting government's jobs⁽²⁾.

South Sudan as a diverse society, it lacks native national language. At present, South Sudan has over sixty cultural and linguistic ethnic groups; each one has loyalty to its tribe rather than centralized authority of the state. What unites South Sudanese is their historical opposition to the north - northern Sudan, but culturally and linguistically, South Sudan is multiethnic society and each tribe differs from other tribes in term of language, culture and loyalty. In spite of diversity in culture and language, people believe that most important to nationhood is equitable distribution of wealth, provision of services, equality of opportunities and protection of lives and properties of citizens of the country⁽³⁾.

South Sudanese citizens think that the threats to national unity and impediment to nationhood are corruption; tribalism; nepotism; discrimination based on ethnic background; age and gender bias; lack of merit in hiring for public service; ignorance and disregard of the constitution⁽⁴⁾.

(1) Lukong Stella Shulika and Nwabufo Okeke- Uzodike, Inter-ethnic conflict in South Sudan: A challenge to peace, <https://www.researchgate.net>, January1,2013, pp. 24-26.

(2) Jok Madut Jok, Diversity, Unity and nation building in South Sudan, special report, United State Institute of Peace (www.suip.org), October 2011, p. 1.

(3) Ibid, p. 3.

(4) Ibid.

Poverty, lack of diverse economic resources, and limitation of opportunities for political offices accessible to ethnic minorities, have fuelled tensions among citizens of South Sudan⁽¹⁾.

Tribalism is the main disease impeding national unity, smooth political and social harmony in South Sudan. It has become a political tool to achieve political position. After independence, politicians embarked on political competition in order to gain upper hand in getting ministerial portfolio in central or state level. By 2013, political wrangling intensified and such led the president Salva Kiir to dismiss his vice president, Dr. Riek Machar and the entire cabinet in July 2013. That decision was an outcome of Riek's intention to contest for the leadership position of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). To consolidate his position as the chairman of the SPLM, president Kiir convened a national liberation council- (the SPLM legislative council) for a meeting in Juba. The meeting passed the party constitution and consolidated Kiir's position. Political manoeuvre used by Kiir's group in the convention, angered Machar and his group and Machar faction walked out of the meeting. Kiir's wing of the party's seized the opportunity and endorsed the party's manifesto which it admired. As a result of rivalry between the two men- the president and vice president, the situation ended up in fighting between them. On 15 December 2013, fighting erupted in Juba - the capital of South Sudan, pitting forces belong to president Kiir and those belonging to vice president Dr. Riek Machar⁽²⁾.

When the civil war started in Juba, it spread into countryside to include seven out of ten states. The war turned into tribal war instead of political war. The war started as a political struggle within the party, but it escalated into tribal warfare, pitting Dinka against Nuer. Why the war turned into tribal fight?. It was a revenge from Nuer because their tribesmen were targeted in Juba by the government army, and therefore, the Nuer killed Dinkas who were residing in Nuer areas⁽³⁾.

(1) Lukong Stella Shulika and Nwabufo Okeke- Uzodike, Inter-ethnic conflict in South Sudan: A challenge to peace, <https://www.researchgate.net>, January 1, 2013, p. 26.

(2) Robert Gerenge, South Sudan's December 2013 conflict, <https://www.accord.org.za/lajcr,2015>.

(3) Christa Chabonneu Kuntzelman, South Sudan: Solutions for moving beyond an ethnic conflict, international research and review: Journal of Phi Beta, Delta Honor society for International Scholars, volume 3, November 1, fall 2013, p. 92.

Tribalism has been affecting South Sudan's establishment. It has been applied in employment staffing, in political competition and social interactions. Most of positions in government are given on the basis of tribal affiliation and clanism.

Language is also another obstacle to nationhood. In the South, no native language which can unite people, so each ethnic group has its own language. English is the official language and school instruction, but is not spoken by the majority of the people because it is a language of educated elite⁽¹⁾.

Cultural diversity in South Sudan impairs social harmony and social integration. There are two types of communities in South Sudan:

1. Pastoralists .

2. Farmers.

1. Pastoralists are cattle keepers and they considered cows and goats as their main livestock. Nilotic tribes are a cattle culture people, in which livestock is the primary criterion of wealth and are used to pay dowry for bride-wealth. Because of paying dowry to the parents of the woman, if young men do not have enough cows, they go and steal cows from neighbouring tribes or clans. So cattle culture hinders social cohesion and leads to insecurity between pastoralists communities⁽²⁾.

2. Farmers community:- this group relies on farming and cultivating land. They cannot cope with pastoralists communities due to lack of understanding regarding grazing land. Those farmers communities include some Bantu tribes in Equatoria region of South Sudan and Fertit tribes in Western Bahr Elghazal, these communities rely on farming .

(1) History of South Sudan, <https://en.wikipedia/w/south Sudan>, p. 23.

(2) Demographic of South Sudan, <https://wikipedia.org>, p. 6.

Chapter Four

Official and popular role in crisis management in the Republic of South Sudan

Chapter Four

Official and popular role in crisis management in the Republic of South Sudan

Section one:

Role of institutions and political leadership:

Ensuing independence, the new regime in South Sudan participated in state establishment procedures that did not give techniques for all persons and parties to compete impartially for posts in political and economic networks or arrangements. Alternatively, the regime's method to state establishment politicized ethnic divisions and made the ethnicity as the basis for political and economic partaking. In South Sudan, one cannot get employment, unless you have patron to back you. Such approach has caused "ethnic antagonism", and has led to the current ongoing political crisis⁽¹⁾.

The December 2013 turbulent strife in South Sudan, has proved that a state building track that exclusively stresses conventional institutional development is not applicable. Resembling any state at its shaping phases, conventional institutions in South Sudan have shown finite ability to answer the needs of citizens and demands for post-independence gains. The state's limited ability has been corroded by political fabricates alleging ethnic supremacy by both the Dinka and Nuer, the major groups to the December 2013 strife⁽²⁾.

The conflict that occurred on December 15, 2013, killed many people and displaced others causing humanitarian catastrophe in the country.

(1) John MukumMbaku, South Sudan: The failure of leadership, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/Africa_infocus,April_21,2014.

(2) Robert Gerenge, South Sudan's December 2013 conflict, <http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/SouthSudan'sDecember-2013conflict,P.1>.

In order to contain fighting in South Sudan, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), dispatched a three men delegation to South Sudan in December 2013 and that delegation was composed of former foreign minister of Ethiopia Mr. Seyoum Mesfin, Kenya's Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and Gen. Mohammed Ahmed Moustafa El Dabi of Sudan.

The mediating delegation succeeded to convince the warring parties and in January 2014, cease fire was signed by the government of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army – IO in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia . In August 2015, IGAD's Mediated Peace Agreement which was termed as compromise Agreement on the Resolution of the conflict in South Sudan was signed in Addis Ababa by the warring parties, the government of South Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Army-IO, and the former political detainees⁽¹⁾.

International community has been involved in helping South Sudan to resolve its problems. European Union has concentrated on supplying humanitarian and development aid and helping civil society in South Sudan. Along with regional and international organizations many countries, such as Ethiopia⁽²⁾, South Africa, Sudan, Japan and China have been embroiled in many ways in helping dispute settlement and peacemaking attempts in South Sudan⁽³⁾.

Among International organizations contributed in crisis management in South Sudan includes World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO has participated in developing health strategic plan to solve urgent health issues. It also provided health services in the Internal displaced people's camps, supplying life-saving drugs to health authorities; helping emergency vaccination campaigns, established medical referral systems for medical evacuation, utilizing medical teams to treat trauma cases in Juba, Malakal, Bentiu and Bor⁽⁴⁾. International organizations, non-governmental organizations and political leadership in South Sudan have been trying to resolve political and economic crises in the country since the outbreak of civil war in December 2013.

(1) KudratVirkand Fritz Nganje, The Peace building Role of civil society in South Sudan, centre for conflict Resolution cape Town, South Africa, November 2016, p.26.

(2) Ali Ahmed, A lesson from crisis Management in South Sudan, Africa Trends, January-June 2019, p.3.

(3) Kudrat Virk and Fritz Nganje, above, p.27.

(4) Emergency Risk Management and Humanitarian Response, issue 23, <http://www.who.int/hac/crises/ssd>, Feb.2015, pp.1-2.

To resolve political crisis facing South Sudan, the president Salva Kiir Mayardit launched the idea of national dialogue. The national dialogue was declared by president Salva Kiir on December 14, 2016, and officially commenced on May 22, 2017. The aim was to achieve peace and tranquility in South Sudan, and establish national consensus and save the country from breaking up or disintegrating⁽¹⁾.

The National Dialogue composed of co-chairmanship of Hon. Abel Alier and Hon. Angelo Beda and the secretariat. The National Dialogue is a three phased process, beginning with the grassroots consultation, followed by the Regional conventions and at last the national convention. The former three regions of Southern Sudan conducted their meetings separately, starting from grassroots to the regional conference. The three regions agreed on several points, which include governance, economic issues, security and social harmony. The three regional conventions agreed on some points and differed on others. The delegates of three regions Bahr El-Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria agreed that the federal form of government should be adopted and endorsed 32 states as federal units of government plus Abyei.

Points of agreement on governance were as follows:

1. The three regions agreed federal form of government as the system to be adopted in South Sudan.
2. Endorsement of 32 states and Abyei Administrative Area and creation of more states.
3. Establishment of presidential system and should be two terms five years consecutively.
4. Commitment to the principles of constitutionalism which recognizes separation of powers between Executive, parliament and judiciary.
5. Peaceful transfer of power through free and fair election.
6. On economic points, the three regions agreed on the following:

(1) Clayton HazvineiVhumbunu, The National Dialogue in South Sudan: Assessing Progress and Pit falls, [www.accord.org.za/conflict trends](http://www.accord.org.za/conflict_trends), January 2018.

1. Diversification of the economy through the development of non-oil sectors such as agriculture and tax collection.
2. Making agriculture as the main engine of growth and using oil revenue to build roads, invest in telecommunication and electricity.
3. Creation of cooperatives to alleviate suffering of citizens in South Sudan.
4. Empowerment of women and youth, through establishment of microfinance institutions.
5. Fighting of corruption and establishment of Anti-corruption court.
6. Fair allocation and distribution of national resources.
7. On security matters, the regional congresses of the three regions agreed on the following security concern:
 1. An immediate end to all forms of violence and hostilities and seek peaceful means to resolve grievances among South Sudanese.
 2. Disarmament of civil population in the whole country.
 3. Rejection of violent means and ethnic mobilization for seeking power.
 4. Establishment of professional and unified army based on merit.

On social issues, the three regions agreed on the following points:

1. Preservation and promotion of cultural diversity in South Sudan.
2. Investment in civic education through public institutions.
3. Speedy and voluntary return of refugees, internally displaced persons to their original homes⁽¹⁾.

Solution of crises in South Sudan has not been left to South Sudanese alone to resolve, but External forces and organizations have been involving in crisis management in South Sudan. Among the participants in crisis management is the European Union (EU). The European Union has been involving in

(1) Communiqués of Regional conferences of Bahr ElGhaZAL, Upper Nile and Equatoria, from 25th February – 2nd March 2019, Wau, Upper Nile conference from 20th -25th May 2019, Juba, Equatoria from 26th – 31st August 2019, Juba, National Dialogue, South Sudan, Juba, pp. 1-3, pp. 2-4, pp. 2-6.

search for the resolution of conflict and humanitarian crisis in South Sudan. European Union has allocated (€ 44.05 million in 2020 for humanitarian assistance in South Sudan. To answer to current flooding in the country, the European Union (EU) allocated 1.4 million Euro (€ 1.4) in September as an immediate answer for water and sanitation emergency needs of the affected population⁽¹⁾. Due to food insecurity and malnutrition in South Sudan, the EU supplied food and nutrition materials across the country. EU funds displaced people and rehabilitates those traumatized by war. Special care is given to the protection of children and women due to their vulnerability of their situation during war period. In response to the desert locust swarms which overrun countries in East Africa in March 2020, the European Union mustered a million (a million Euro) in humanitarian assistance for South Sudan to solve food scarcities, supply nutrition assistance, consolidate logistics services and give livelihood assistance to pastoralists and farmers affected by the outbreak of the desert locust in the country⁽²⁾.

Section Two:

Popular (civil societies) role in crisis management in the Republic of South Sudan:

South Sudanese civil society players have real effect on accomplishing some betterments in preserving human security in South Sudan. Within three months from the beginning of the civil war which broke out in December 2013, the fighting displaced internally “760,000” inside South Sudan and caused over “173,000 refugees in Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya”. South Sudanese civil society organizations performed a major role in the distribution of humanitarian assistance and alarming the government and international community about the security concern facing vulnerable civil population in the country⁽³⁾.

Civil society organizations in South Sudan have committed in the execution of the August 2015 peace accord. Learned from the lessons of the incomplete

(1) <https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/africa/SouthSudan-en,30/09/2020,pp.1-2>

(2) Ibid, p. 2.

(3) Kudrat Virk and Fritz Nganje, Civil society and peace building: Local and National processes; The peace building role of civil society in South Sudan, Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report, Pretoria, South Africa, November 2016, p. 14.

or lack of implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement, the civil society organizations have been preparing the foundation for the execution of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediated peace agreement. For instance, many civil society organizations have established educational interchange schemes in order to permit South Sudanese to interact with their mates in African countries such as Rwanda and Kenya who have experienced the same lessons. Civil society organizations have also been outspoken in elevating worries about postponements in executing main points of the peace agreement such as the demilitarization of Juba city, whereas enticing the attention of foreign players including the Troika countries – United States, Norway and United Kingdom, to put pressure on stakeholders of the peace accord in order to implement it. The Troika countries played a significant role in signing the Addis Ababa peace agreement which was signed in September 2018⁽¹⁾.

Civil society organizations including church were hopeful of building peace in South Sudan. For many years, church has been participating in humanitarian services and searching for peace in South Sudan. It was for its background of working for peace that led the church to respond to contain civil unrest which occurred in December 2013⁽²⁾.

Civil society organizations pursued to handle the matters in advance and analysis was made in order to prepare for eventuality and avoid problems which might cause crisis. The conflict in South Sudan have not been ignored by civil society organizations. When President Salva Kiir sacked vice president Dr. Riek Machar and dissolved council of ministers in July 2014, the church was knowledgeable that peace was at risk. Envoys were dispatched to the president to avoid crisis. Afterward, a good number of pastoral letters signed by religious and eminent personalities were given to conflicting parties in the disputes. So, civil society combined their efforts and formed a platform called “citizens for peace and justice” in January 2014⁽³⁾. Despite of being restricted in peace negotiations, civil society has been playing positive role in realizing peace in South Sudan.

(1) Ibid, p. 24.

(2) KisukeNdiku, South Sudan: a challenging space for civil society, <https://www.peaceinsight.org/blog>, September 15,2014, p.1.

(3) Ibid, p. 4.

Section Three:

Future of state building in the Republic of South Sudan:

South Sudan inherited weak institutions from the Sudan, and therefore, it failed to execute developmental and social programmes. Due to power struggle within the ruling party – the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the country slipped into civil war in December 2013. As a result of war, more than two million died and more other millions displaced internally and others went to neighbouring countries such as Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia as refugees. Because of failure in governing the country, South Sudan has been called a pre-failed state. A suitable term proposes that South Sudan which came into being in July 2011, failed before it was born. The responsibility for such failure rests with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Impotent to translate its programme it fought for to practice in delivering basic services, the militarized nature of SPLM/A and its failure to convert into a democratic administration with a clear direction of state building is the real cause of the current political crisis in the Republic of South Sudan⁽¹⁾.

Mehari Taddele Maru suggests four scenarios for the future of South Sudan, which are as follows:

1. Best scenario: caretaker government.
2. Acceptable scenario: Government of national unity.
3. Bad scenario: status quo.
4. Worst scenario: total civil war.

Scenarios in details:

1. Best scenario, which is caretaker government:

Due to the intense hostility between the conflicting groups, the best scenario for South Sudan is the caretaker government comprised of

(1) Mehari Taddele Marue, What does the future hold for South Sudan? Aljazeera media network, July 8, 2014, p. 1.

independent technocrats to lead the transitional period. This arrangement would exclude the two leaders of the warring factions from holding any leadership position during the transitional period.

2. Acceptable scenario, which is government of national unity. Under this scenario, the government of national unity would be inclusive. All political factions will be included in the government. Such scenario was adopted in Kenya from 2008 – 2013, and in Zimbabwe from 2009 – 2013. Governments of national unity do not meet democratic experiment, but achieve stability and reduce political crisis.
3. bad scenario, which is status quo. Maintenance of the current existing situation or the current government forms a bad scenario, where the SPLM faction led by Salva Kiir remains in power excluding others.
4. Worst scenario, which will lead to total civil war. The war of liberation which took many years, has created a war culture in the minds of South Sudanese. Compromise modality in sharing power is not acceptable in South Sudanese political culture, and therefore, culture of non-compromise has been the habit of South Sudanese politicians. None cooperation among politicians will lead to total civil war in South Sudan⁽¹⁾.

Numerous crises have been facing South Sudan since independence in 2011. Among such crises, is corruption. Corruption has acute problem facing the country and many reports have come out recording huge corruption financially, administratively and politically. Many organizations including United Nations have found out cases of corruption. UN investigators have worried that peace in South Sudan is fragile and the future of its people is being compromised by intensely rooted government corruption. The UN Human Rights Commission has reported recently about human rights violation in South Sudan. It reported projects aimed at enriching the political elite at the expense of poor citizens. The commission on human rights in South Sudan has documented widespread human rights violations and deadly situations that are ripping communities apart and inflaming ethnic and religious hatred.

(1) Ibid, pp. 2-3.

The commission advocates or suggests the establishment of the hybrid court, comprised of judges and prosecutors from South Sudan and judges from Africa countries, in order to stop the country's crisis⁽¹⁾.

A group who called themselves concerned citizens in South Sudan warns that the condition in the country is going to be worse unless a real inclusive political dialogue is to start. They said that South Sudan's political crisis cannot be resolved by war, but by political dialogue on the basis of clear vision accepting unity in diversity in South Sudan.

The concerned citizen's network for peace (CCNP) has just recently published manifesto containing their vision for South Sudan. The main aim is to encourage open discussion and inspire those in power to promote a peaceful future for South Sudan, but at the same time to be prepared for other situations. The CCNP conducted its report by predicting five scenarios to happen in South Sudan. Such five scenarios are:

1. Unity in diversity.
2. Divided leadership.
3. Fragmentation.
4. 21 kingdoms.
5. Dictatorship.

According to the concerned citizen's network for peace (CCNP), without quick action, South Sudan is facing one of the worse three scenarios: fragmentation, dictatorship and 21 kingdoms. The CCNP prefers and supports unity in diversity which can be attained through political will and dialogue⁽²⁾.

The peaceful future of South Sudan has become a concern of all political forces in the country and its immediate neighbouring countries. In order to bring peace in South Sudan, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediated peace negotiation in 2015. The warring parties in South Sudan accepted the IGAD mediation and the agreement on the Resolution

(1) Lisa Schlein, Voanews.com/ Africa, South Sudan in focus, September 23, 2020, p. 1.

(2) Debuting South Sudan's future, pax, reliefweb.int/report, December 11, 2017, p.1.

of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan was signed in Addis Ababa in August 2015, but it collapsed in July 2016, and the country went back to war. In 2018, Sudan's president Omer Hassan El bashir, brought the warring parties to Khartoum and revitalized agreement on resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan was initialed in Khartoum in June 2018. In September 2018, the Revitalized Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was signed in Addis Ababa on 12 September, 2018.

The parties to the conflict, composing of Transitional Government of National Unity of Republic of South Sudan (TGONU), The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), the South Sudan opposition Alliance (SSOA), Former Detainees (FDs), Other Political Parties (OPP), agreed and committed themselves to implement the peace agreement.

The parties resolved to establish a Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGONU) in the Republic of South Sudan. The agreement is summarized and important chapters and sub-articles will be mentioned and rest will be left. The following are some of important chapters:

Chapter 1: Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity:

1.1. Establishment, seat and term of TGONU:

1.1.1. There shall be established a Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGONU) in the Republic of South Sudan entrusted with the task of implementing this agreement;

1.1.2 The transitional period shall commence eight (8) months after signing of this agreement and the term of office shall be thirty six (36) months preceded by eight (8) months of pre-Transitional period;

1.1.3. The seat of RTGONU shall be in Juba;

1.1.4. The term and mandate of RTGONU shall be for the duration of Transitional period, until such time that elections are held, except as provided for this agreement;

1.1.5. The RTGONU shall hold elections sixty (60) days before the end of the

Transitional Period in order to establish a democratically elected government;

1.1.6. Responsibility will be shared in Executive of the RTGONU among the following parties: Incumbent TGONU, SPLM/A-IO, SSOA, FDs and OPP;

1.2. Mandate of the RTGONU

1.2.1. The RTGONU shall:

1.2.2. Implement this agreement and restore permanent and sustainable peace, security and stability in the country;

1.2.3. Expedite the relief, protection, voluntary and dignified repatriation, rehabilitation, resettlement and reintegration of IDPs and returnees, working closely with the United Nations and other international agencies;

1.2.4. Facilitate and oversee a people-driven process of national reconciliation and healing through an independent mechanism in accordance with this agreement including budgetary provisions for compensation and reparations;

1.2.5. Oversee and ensure that the permanent constitution making process is successfully carried out and completed before the end of the Transitional Period;

1.2.6. Work closely with the IGAD- PLUS member states and organizations and other parties and friends of South Sudan, to consolidate peace and stability in the country;

1.2.7. Carry out radical reforms and transformation of public financial management systems to ensure transparency and accountability;

1.2.8. Ensure prudent, transparent accountability management of national wealth and resources to build the nation and promote the welfare of the people;

1.2.9. Carry out the function of government;

1.2.10. Restructure, rehabilitate and ensure reforms of the civil services;

1.2.11. Design and implement security sector reforms and security sector transformation, to include the restructuring and reconstitution of institution;

1.2.12. Rebuild and recover destroyed physical infrastructure and give special attention to prioritizing the rebuilding of livelihood of those affected by the conflict;

1.2.13. Reconstitute a competent and independent national Elections Commission (NEC) to conduct free, fair and credible elections before the end of the Transitional Period and ensure that the outcome reflects the will of the electorate;

1.2.14. Conduct a national population and housing census before the end of the Transitional Period;

1.2.15. Devolve more powers and resources to the state and local Government levels;

In chapter four, the following articles and sub-articles mentioned are: 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.14, 4.16. Articles and sub-articles in detail:

Chapter Four: Institutional Reforms:

4.2.1. Bank of South Sudan (BSS):

4.2.1.1. The RTGONU shall, within three (3) months of the beginning of the Transition, review legislation governing the Bank of South Sudan (BSS) with a view to restructure and enable it to render efficient and effective services. This restructuring shall include, but not limited to the leadership, composition, powers, functions and operations.

4.2.1.2. The nomenclature of the Bank of South Sudan (BSS) shall be decided upon the promulgation of the new constitution.

4.2.2. The Bank of South Sudan shall:

4.2.2.1. be independent in its statutory and supervisory function.

4.2.2.2. be responsible for formulating monetary policy, promoting price stability, issuing currency, regulating the financial sector, and performing other functions conferred upon it by the law;

4.2.2.3. be headed by a competent and appropriately qualified governor;

4.2.2.4. adopt comprehensive reforms to improve its supervisory and regulatory functions and prudential regulatory roles;

4.2.2.5. Have a board of nine (9) members, at least 3 shall be women, appointed by the president in consultation and agreement with the first vice president and the vice presidents;

4.2.3. Within four (4) months upon the commencement of the Transitional Period, the president shall appoint the governor of the Bank of South Sudan in consultation and agreement with the first vice president and vice presidents;

4.3. Ministry of finance and planning:

4.3.1. The ministry of finance and planning shall:

4.3.1.1. within nine (9) months of the signing of the Agreement, review and implement the strategic Economic Development Road map (national development plan) to accelerate progress in collaboration and coordination with an inter-ministerial department and where appropriate, with development partners;

4.3.1.2. ensure that all public financial and budgetary commitments entered into by the RTGONU are transparent, competitive and in accordance with the laws of the country and internationally accepted norms and practices for the management of public finances;

4.3.1.3. ensure sustainability of public finance across all levels of government through rigorous adherence to national laws and international standards;

4.3.1.4. ensure that the national budget and the budget at each levels of government addresses national priorities, and the realities on the ground without negatively affecting the macro-economic stability;

4.3.1.5. within nine (9) months of the transition, review the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) programme in accordance with this agreement;

4.3.1.6. increase partnership, coordination and mutual accountability with development and humanitarian partners to ensure policies, strategies, programme and projects, and action plans are developed through participatory and transparent mutual consent and accountability;

4.3.1.7. Monitor and evaluate issues of importance including review of the new deal compact in coordination with development and humanitarian partners;

4.3.1.8. ensure that development partners and recipients of any development assistance, provide timely and comprehensive data on aid flows to the states, sectors and institutions of South Sudan;

4.4. Anti-corruption commission

4.4.1. In order to fight corruption, the RTGONU shall:

4.4.1.1. review within five (5) months of transition, the anti-corruption commission act 2009 with the aim of enabling the commission to effectively perform its functions of protecting public property, investigating and prosecuting cases of corruption, combating administrative malpractices in public institutions, and promoting ethical standards;

4.4.1.2. protect the independence of Anti-corruption Commission and empower it from political interference with corruption cases whether at the investigation stage or at the commencement of trial before court of law;

4.4.1.3. harmonize the role of the Anti-corruption commission with the ministry of Justice and constitutional affairs/ director of public prosecution and the police, in the fight against corruption;

4.4.1.4. strengthen legal and institutional frameworks of the Anti-corruption commission and ensure their enforcement;

4.4.1.5. involve media, civil society, women's organizations, youth and faith leaders in policy advocacy against corruption and raising public awareness to strengthen capacity of the public to resist and prevent corruption;

4.4.1.6. accede to regional and international convention on fighting corruption particularly to African Convention on Preventing and combating corruption (AUCOC) and UN convention against corruption (UNCAC), and coordinate with their respective implementation mechanisms and other institutions to recover and return misappropriated funds and assets;

4.4.1.7. within two months of the Transitional Period, the president shall in consultation and agreement with the first vice president and the vice

presidents nominate the head of the Anti-corruption commission and pass his or her nomination to the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) for approval;

4.5. National Audit Chamber:

4.5.1. The RTGONU shall, within three months (3) of the Transitional Period, review the national Audit Chamber Act 2011, and guarantee its independence;

4.5.2. The chamber shall be independent and carry out its functions without political interference;

4.5.3. The revised national Audit chamber Act 2011, shall provide for the qualifications of a national Audit general, which shall among others, include wide-ranging knowledge of public finance and extensive experience in auditing or public finance management;

4.5.4. within four (4) months of the Transitional Period, the president shall in consultation and agreement with the first vice president and the vice presidents nominate a national Auditor- General for the approval by the TNLA.

4.6. New Institutions:

4.6.1. without prejudice to other provisions of this agreement, the RTGONU shall establish the following new institutions immediately upon the commencement of the transitional period;

4.6.1.1. Public procurement and Asset Disposal Authority.

4.6.1.2. Salaries and remuneration commission;

4.6.1.3. Environmental management authority.

4.6.1.4. Research and development centers: natural disaster, strategic studies and scientific research;

4.6.1.5. Health care support funds;

4.6.1.6. Students support fund;

4.11. Wealth sharing and revenue allocation

4.11.1. the revenue collected by the national government shall be allocated to the different levels of government;

4.11.2. the RTGONU shall within two (2) months from the start of the Transitional Period, review and reinvigorate the independent fiscal and financial Allocation Monitoring Commission (FFAMC), which shall comprise experts nominated by the states and national government to ensure transparency in regard to the allocation of nationally collected funds to the states and counties:

4.11.3. FFAMC regulations and procedures shall be adopted at state and county levels;

4.11.4. In line with the agreement on the devolution of more powers and resources to the state and counties, wealth sharing and revenue allocation shall be worked out by the RTGONU within three (3) months of the commencement of the Transitional Period;

4.11.5. The proportion of the natural resource wealth of South Sudan shared with the states and counties shall be increased and that the final terms of the increment and formulate to be applied shall be determined in the permanent constitution;

4.11.6. the RTGONU shall not withhold an allocation due to a state or local government in South Sudan. Any level of government may initiate proceedings in the court of law should any other organ or level withhold its duly authorized funds.

Procedures to be followed for the permanent constitution making according to chapter six (6) of the Revitalized Agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) are as follows:

6.1 The RTGONU shall initiate and oversee a permanent constitution making process, during the Transitional Period.

6.2 The permanent constitution making process shall be based on the principles of:

6.2.1. Supremacy of the people of South Sudan;

6.2.2. Initiate a federal and democratic system of government that reflects

the character of South Sudan in its various institutions taken together, guarantee good governance, constitutionalism, rule of law, human rights, gender equity and affirmative action;

6.2.3. Guaranteeing peace and stability, national unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan;

6.2.4. Promoting people's participation in the governance of the country through democratic, free and fair election and the devolution of powers and resources to the states and counties;

6.2.5. Respecting ethnic and regional diversity and communal rights, including the right of communities to preserve their history, develop their language, promote their culture and expression of their ideas;

6.2.6. Ensuring the provision of the basic needs of the people through the establishment of a framework for fair and equitable economic growth and access to national resources and services;

6.2.7. Promoting and facilitating regional and international cooperation with South Sudan;

6.2.8. Committing the people of South Sudan to peaceful resolution of national issues through dialogue, tolerance, accommodation and respect of others opinions,

6.3. The reconstituted TNLA – Transitional National Legislative Assembly shall within the first six (6) months of Transitional Period enact a legislation to govern the constitutional making process;

6.4. The permanent constitution shall be completed not later than twenty-four (24) months following the establishment of the Transitional Period and shall be in place to guide the elections towards the end of the transition;

6.5. the following phases of constitution- making process shall be complete within twenty-four (24) months of the transitional period as per the timetable stipulated in the implementation mechanism process except for the transformation of the TNLA into a constituent assembly to adopt the new constitution which shall be defined by law;

6.6. The Executive of the Revitalized TGONU after adequate consultation with all stakeholders including the political parties, civil society organizations, women groups, youth and faith based groups, shall reconstitute the national constitution review commission (NCRC) and appoints preparatory sub-committee for convening a national constitutional conference (NCC) in accordance with the Act governing constitution making process;

6.7. during the fourth month of transitional period, a workshop shall be convened for the parties to the R-ARCSS by the Revitalised Joint Monitoring and Evaluation commission (RJMEC) to agree on the details of conducting the constitution making process;

6.8. The workshop shall be moderated and facilitated by an institute renowned internationally for constitution making;

6.9. The outcome of the workshop shall form the basis for drafting the legislation to be enacted to govern the constitution making process;

6.10 The constitutional text adopted by the constitutional conference shall be presented by the minister of Justice and constitutional affair to constituent assembly for deliberation and adoption;

6.11. The parties agree that the transitional national legislature shall be transformed into a constituent assembly on the 1st date of the 27th months of the transition for purposes of adopting the permanent constitution after which it shall be dissolved preceding the elections;

6.12. In drafting the permanent constitution, lessons shall be drawn from South Sudan common law, constitutional history and experience, and this agreement;

6.13. The process of permanent constitution – making shall be led by the people of South Sudan;

6.14. The RTGONU shall review the ongoing permanent constitution making process and reconstitute the national constitution making process and reconstituted the national constitution review commission (NCRC);

In order to ensure quality of participation and inclusiveness in the reformulated constitution review process, the composition of the reconstituted NCRC shall include but not be limited to representatives of the RTGONU, political parties,

faith-based groups, women groups, youth, ethnic minorities, representatives of the private sector, civil society organizations (CSO) groups, academics, people with the special needs and other professionals. The process of appointment shall be as defined in the reviewed and enacted legislation governing the constitutional making process;

6.15. The RTGONU shall provide in its budgetary provisions adequate funding for the constitutional making process;

6.16. The RTGONU and the NCRC shall seek the assistance of regional and international experts to benefit from the experience, expertise and best practices to assist in the constitutional making process⁽¹⁾.

In search for political stability and peaceful coexistence in South Sudan, 518 delegates, representing 80 counties, eminent persons, political parties, faith-based groups, civil society, business communities, professional associations and organizations, representatives of organized forces, women and youth groups, were convened or called by the South Sudan national Dialogue steering committee headed by co-chairmanship of Hon. Abel Alier and Hon. Angelo Beda in Juba between 3rd – 17th November 2020, to discuss problems facing South Sudan. The delegates concluded by recommending the following resolutions:

A. On governance the conference resolved and recommended :

1. Federalism as the best form of political system.
2. Presidential form of government should be adopted,
3. President should contest two consecutive five year terms only.
4. 32 states plus be reinstated.
5. Separation of powers among three organs of government-executive, legislature and judiciary.
6. Concurrent service in the parliament and the executive should be discarded, if a member of parliament appointed to be a minister, he/she should resign from parliament.

(1) Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Addis Ababa, 12 September 2015, pp. 2-3, 47-50- 56-57, 71-73.

7. President should appoint judges on the recommendation of the judicial service commission.
8. Peaceful transfer of power through election.
9. The government should criminalize the abduction and trafficking of children.
10. Adoption or endorsement of Abyei Referendum.

B. On Economic issue, the conference recommended:

1. Diversification of economy, by making agriculture as the main engine of growth.
2. Equitable share of financial resources between federal government and states governments.
3. Urges the government to address pollution caused by oil companies.
4. Enactment of an environmental law.
5. Modernization of gold exploration, mining and processing.
6. The government should increase food production locally.
7. Establishment of cooperatives in order to alleviate the suffering of the poor.
8. Empowerment of women and youth.
9. Eradication of corruption.

C. On security issue, the conference recommended:

1. Immediate end of all forms of violence in the country.
2. Creation of professional national Army and other organized forces.
3. Establishment of military justice system.
4. Improvement of salaries of organized forces.
5. Creation of military barracks, and provision of housing, health care and social welfare for soldiers.

6. An end of cattle raiding.
7. The government of South Sudan should take control of air space in the country.
8. Stop rewarding rebels with high military ranks and stop integrating militias into the national army.

D. On social cohesion, the conference recommended:

1. Enactment of legislation for the establishment of truth, healing and reconciliation commission.
2. Repatriation of internally displaced people and refugees to their original homes.
3. Establishment of education centers for homeless children, orphans and wounded heroes and allocate land for war widows.
4. Criminalization of hate speech.
5. Preservation and promotion of historical, natural sites and building of museum.
6. Reclaiming South Sudan's archives from the former colonial masters, such as Turkey, United Kingdom, Egypt and Sudan.
7. Promotion of Annual cultural shows for all nationalities to promote national diversity and encourage inter-communal dialogues in order to promote peaceful co-existence among communities⁽¹⁾.

(1) The South Sudan National Dialogue, National conference, Juba, South Sudan. 3rd – 17th November 2020, pp 2-7.

Conclusion

Concept of state building according to Anders Persson, is based on security dimension, political dimension and economic dimension. He stress security dimension as the most important among the three dimension. In the case of South Sudan, I emphasise political dimension, because political leadership in South Sudan lacks vision and political direction, and therefore, political crisis occurred, which led to insecurity in the country. When there is an absent of security, economy will be affected. So, when the civil war erupted in December 2013, the economy of South Sudan was interrupted and living standard deteriorated.

According to political scientists, state-building involves political deals, prioritization of core government functions and the willingness to respond to public expectations. When South Sudan gained its independence in 2011, people expected their government to deliver them services, building roads and providing security, but it turned opposite. The ruling elite embarked on competing to acquire more wealth, fighting over positions in government, and getting contracts. No roads were built, no services delivered such as schools and hospitals, so, South Sudanese become disappointed and despaired. No country can prosper without visionary and wise leadership. What is lacking in South Sudan is leadership, but the country is very rich, it can feed its citizens and help its neighbours.

The government of South Sudan was expected by its citizens to implement requirements of state-building which include, defending of borders, governing of its citizens, collection of taxes and delivery of services. But the government failed to meet its duties of protecting life and properties of its citizens and delivering of services.

South Sudan failed as an effective state from its independence. In Africa, causes of state failure are bad leaders, rapacious players-actors, such as warlords, bad economic policies, uncondusive environments and unfriendly or bad neighbours. In the case of South Sudan three factors apply to failure of South Sudan as a viable state at the moment. Such three causes of state failure are bad leaders, warlordism and bad neighbours. Regarding bad leaders in South Sudan, politicians rely on their tribes rather than political

ideology and programmes. That policy has divided the country on tribal lines rather than centralized loyalty.

Concerning greedy players-actors, who are warlords, warlords have been igniting ethnic tensions since independence and could lead to state failure. The warlords have controlled the periphery of the country and such has weakened the central government.

Regarding bad neighbours, two countries of South Sudan's neighbours have been involving in South Sudan's politics since its foundation. Uganda and Sudan have been meddling in South Sudan's internal affairs and that interference has caused political instability in South Sudan.

South Sudan has been suffering from political crisis since its independence from Sudan in 2011. The term crisis is defined as a significant threat to operations that can have negative repercussions if not managed correctly. In South Sudan, there is a political crisis caused by political competition among ruling elite. Instead of achieving political supremacy through peaceful means, the ruling elite opted to realize political gains through violent means, which led into civil war in 2013. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement's leaders have lost vision of their movement and have confined themselves for self-interests. They caused political crisis and are unable to fix it and resolve the causes of disagreement, which can bring a lasting solution in the country.

The problem which faced South Sudan since independence was the combination of political and military wings of Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army as one entity. The SPLA became partner with SPLM in ruling the country. So, political involvement of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in politics ignited fear in the rival camp and political divide within South's political elite. Tension which was caused by political rivalry within the SPLM between president Salva Kiir and vice president Dr. Riek Machar culminated into fighting on 15 December 2013, and erupted into civil war in the country.

When civil conflict occurred in December 2013, it affected the economy and displaced civil population and some people became internally displaced and others fled to neighbouring countries to become refugees. South Sudan's pound lost its value and inflation rose to high level. Such interruption of

economic production has paralysed the economy and government could not afford to pay salaries of employees of the country.

In order to bring peace to South Sudan, political leadership, Religious, NGOs and friends of South Sudan have involved in peacemaking. Such attempts of searching for peace has resulted into the signing of Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018. The government from its side initiated national dialogue which came up with resolutions and recommendations for political solution in the country. The national dialogue called for the establishment of federal form of government, and presidential system, in which president will be elected for five years, consecutive two terms.

To my own view, presidential system in Africa leans towards dictatorship and it has failed. In addition, presidential system in our case in South Sudan is less representative, and therefore, I suggest and stress parliamentary form of government, because is more representative to our situation, in parliamentary system, prime minister cannot dictate his policies or opinions on others, unless he has confidence of his party.

If South Sudanese want permanent settlement of their differences, they should try parliamentary system. People of South Sudan should study presidential and parliamentary forms of government. Due to our diversity culturally and socially, we need to adopt suitable system to our society, and that system is parliamentary form of government.

Results-facts finding of the study:

The study found the following facts:

1. Political crisis caused by infighting among members of the ruling party – The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. The crisis was a result of political competition among SPLM leaders;
2. Weakness of political system, where there were no trained civil servants and well-established institutions;
3. The effect of 2010 elections which caused rifts in ranks and files of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, and some expelled leaders took up arms against the regime;

4. Lack of strong political opposition. Most opposition political parties engaged in fighting over positions in government;
5. Existing of bad neighbors. Since independence in 2011, South Sudan has been experiencing interference from Sudan and Uganda;
6. Economic crisis caused by corruption and mismanagement of economic and oil resources;
7. Tribalism and mismanagement of ethnic and cultural diversity;
8. Conflicting interests of pastoralists and farmers.

Recommendations:

In order to realize political stability in South Sudan, necessary the political leadership should adopt the following recommendations:

1. Delivery of services to the people of South Sudan;
2. Development of human resources;
3. Proper management of oil and economic resources;
4. Proper management of ethnic and cultural diversity;
5. Construction of roads and bridges;
6. Establishment of civil service commission where by merit will be the basis of employment;
7. Establishment of democratic governance;
8. Adopt polices of economic reforms;
9. Acceptance of peaceful transfer of political power;
10. Acceptance of coexistence between diverse communities in South Sudan.
11. National Dialogue.

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
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Appendix:







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